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A newsletter devoted to operational police officers in Canada.
Be Smart & Stay Safe
IN MEMORIAM
On March 1, 2010 36-year-old Peel Regional 
Police Service Constable Artem (James) 
Ochakovsky was killed in an automobile 
accident in Brampton, Ontario. He was on 
patrol when his vehicle collided with 
another vehicle at an intersection.
Constable Ochakovsky had served 
with the agency for two years. He is 
survived by his wife and 3-year-old 
son.
!"#$%&'(%()&*+
,-.'*/01234'05637'849':4;<=2>;<41'07%7'?@#'.AB
!"#$%&'!(%)*+,-
A PEER READ PUBLICATION
('>49;54<<41'346C<43'<C'CD41E<2C>E5'DC52/4'CFF2/41;'E/1C;;'012<2;G'%C5H=I2E7
04'J=E1<'E>3'J<EK'JEF4?C5H=4','$;;H4'L
*E1/GM(D125'LNN,
$8'*&*"O$(#
./# 01234# 56# 5++7# 85,9:12,;<=#
(;/>?1@<:#A1/B:<#C:>>B:2# ;D# ?4:# E1F1<#
G;<B3:# A:H12?I:/?# J1># D1?1<<9# >4;?#
=K2B/L#1#=2KL#@K>?#B/#M2;>>12=6#NK:@:3O#
PB># H12?/:2# (;/>?1@<:# $?:H41/:#
Q;2@:>#J1>#J;K/=:=#B/#?4:#12IO
(;/>?1@<:>#C:>>B:2#1/=#Q;2@:>#41=#
@::/# H12?# ;D# 1# <12L:# >BIK<?1/:;K>#
3213R=;J/# ;/# 1# =2KL,=:1<B/L#
/:?J;2R#JB?4# >:1234#J1221/?># ;K?#
D;2#:BL4?#<;31?B;/>6#>BS#B/#E1F1<#1/=#
?J;#B/#M2;>>12=O
(;/>?1@<:# C:>>B:2# 41=# @::/#
1>>BL/:=#?;#?4:#I;21<B?9#1/=#=2KL#>TK1=#;/<9#;/:#J::R#
@:D;2:#4B>#=:1?4O#P:#41=#@::/#1#H;<B3:#;DDB3:2#D;2#*U#
9:12>O
(;/>?1@<:# C:>>B:2# B># >K2FBF:=# @9# 4B>#
JBD:6# J4;# 1<>;# >:2F:># 1># 1# H;<B3:#
3;/>?1@<:6# 1/=# ?J;# 9;K/L# =1KL4?:2>#
1L:>#*+#1/=#*5O
VB?4# ?4:# =:1?4# ;D# (;/>?1@<:# C:>>B:26# 1# ?;?1<# ;D# *W#
H;<B3:#;DDB3:2>#41F:#<;>?#?4:B2#<BF:>#?;#LK/DB2:#;F:2#?4:#
H1>?#*+#9:12>O#.?4:2#;DDB3:2>#RB<<:=#@9#LK/DB2:#B/3<K=:)
!""#$
# # !"#$%&'()*+&,-*."/,0&1)$
# # XK<9#*Y6#5++Y#
# # &(0G#$1>R1?34:J1/
* * !"#$%&'()*2"'3#*!&4),"#
# # XK<9#*U6#5++Y#
# # &(0G#$1>R1?34:J1/
# # !"#$%&'()*5"6#*7%83#$"#
# # 019#U6#5++Y
# # VB/=>;2#G;<B3:#$:2FB3:#./?12B;#
#
!""%$
* !"#$%&'()*9&(),3)*:31#&-
# # A:3:I@:2#*86#5++U
# # E1F1<#G;<B3:#A:H12?I:/?
#
* * !"#$%&'()*7#%6"#;*:",0"#
# # 01234#W6#5++U
# # &(0G#Z<@:2?1
#
* * !"#$%&'()*<3"#30)*5"6#$%"#
# # 01234#W6#5++U
# # &(0G#Z<@:2?1
* * !"#$%&'()*.,"-8*+;,"(
# # 01234#W6#5++U
# # &(0G#Z<@:2?1
* !"#$%&'()*=)%),*>-63)4&##
# # 01234#W6#5++U
# # &(0G#Z<@:2?1
!""&$
* * !",?",&(*5&4)$*:&(("@&;
# # Q:@2K129#5-6#5++8
# # &(0G#Z<@:2?1
!""!$
* * !"#$%&'()*.)#"3%*<AB-/;),
# # Q:@2K129#5-6#5++5
# # 0;/?2:1<#G;<B3:#$:2FB3:
#
!""'$
* * * !"#$%&'()*C)##3$*>%,"#1D/3((
# # # A:3:I@:2#5*6#5++*#
# # # &(0G#01/B?;@1
# # # !"#$%&'()*5/,1)#*>))@&(0
# # # 01234#U6#5++*
# # # &(0G#"K/1FK?
!"#$%&'( )**+%&$( ,"-.( /&0"$+12( 314&5( 161+2172&( 18(
---9":0;9"$4<%1.1:1
E6
);
*&
,)
*"
/,
*6
),
")
$F*
G
)*
$6
&(
(*#
"%
*H"
,1
)%
*%6
)4
F
E6
);
*&
,)
*"
/,
*6
),
")
$F*
G
)*
$6
&(
(*#
"%
*H"
,1
)%
*%6
)4
F
E6
);
*&
,)
*"
/,
*6
),
")
$F*
G
)*
$6
&(
(*#
"%
*H"
,1
)%
*%6
)4
F
E6
);
*&
,)
*"
/,
*6
),
")
$F*
G
)*
$6
&(
(*#
"%
*H"
,1
)%
*%6
)4
F
Source: Officer Down Memorial Page available at www.odmp.org/canada
On March 8, 2010 37-year-old Ontario Provincial Police 
Constable Vu Pham was shot and killed while making  a traffic 
stop in a rural area near Leadbury, Ontario.
He was responding  to a call when he stopped the vehicle. The 
70-year-old driver of the car immediately opened fire on 
Constable Pham. Over 25 shots were fired in the subsequent 
exchange in which Constable Pham was fatally wounded.
The suspect was shot and wounded by other officers a short 
time later.
Constable Pham was transported to London 
Health Sciences Centre, where he 
succumbed to his wounds.
Constable Pham had served with the 
Ontario Provincial Police for 15 years. He 
is survived by his wife and three children.
Source: Officer Down Memorial Page available at www.odmp.org/canada
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POLICE LEADERSHIP 
APRIL 10-13, 2011
Mark your calendars. 
The British Columbia 
Association of Chiefs of 
Police, the Ministry of 
P u b l i c S a f e t y a n d 
Solicitor General, and 
the Justice Institute of 
British Columbia Police 
Academy are hosting  the Police Leadership 2011 
Conference in Vancouver, British Columbia. This 
is Canada’s largest police leadership conference 
and will provide an opportunity for delegates to 
discuss leadership topics presented by world 
renowned speakers.
www.policeleadershipconference.com
!!!"#$%&"'()
*+,-./010233-/0)
4(5'67895:,0)$$1
;2<;=2<;>?02@0>;2?02??AB
!"
!"#$"%&'()*$+',-).&%)/010%$2)3&)!%$1040"5)
670809:$);&"%$"%8<
=
6*$>?+:)@?'A&8$<)BC);-0:2)@-&%&8)D$%$'10"$2)
B9E$,%0#$:(
FG
*+C$%()*$+',-)H?8%0C0$2)!");0',?18%+",$8)BC)
I+''+"%)J>$,?%0&"
FK
L''$8%)*%+"2+'2)D&$8).&%)M$N?0'$)@'01+)O+,0$)
;+8$)O&');&"#0,%0&"
FP
H?25$).&%)M$N?0'$2)3&)J"2&'8$)D("+10,)
;D*L)*$+',-
FQ
D?+:)@?'A&8$)!",02$"%+:)*$+',-)/+RC?:)*&)
/&"5)L8)B"$)@?'A&8$)M$+8&"+9:$
KG
S?"8T)U+0:)V)H+0:W)U0::);XK)M$#0$R K=
*?A'$1$);&?'%)Y$+'0"58)M08$ KZ
L''$8%0"5) BCC0,$') M$:(0"5) B") [&'$) 3-+")
!"#$8%05+%&'<8)U'&+2)BA0"0&")
P=
!"#$%%& '()$*+,%$& "'($-.& /##& /*(,0#$%& /*$& /1()'*$-& 23& 45(6&
7,8$& 9':/8'+%8,.& 7;& <;22'(%='*-& >'#,0$?6& @)$& /*(,0#$%&
0'"(/,"$-&)$*$,"&/*$&A*':,-$-&='*&,"='*B/(,'"&A1*A'%$%&'"#3&
/"-&/*$&"'(&('&2$&0'"%(*1$-&/%&#$5/#&'*&'()$*&A*'=$%%,'"/#&
/-:,0$6& @)$& 'A,",'"%& $CA*$%%$-& /*$& "'(& "$0$%%/*,#3& ()$&
'A,",'"%& '=& ()$& D1%(,0$& E"%(,(1($& '=& F*,(,%)& G'#1B2,/6& H#$%
&'()*+',% -./0I& +$#0'B$%& 3'1*& 0'BB$"(%& '"& '*&
0'"(*,21(,'"%&('&(),%&"$+%#$(($*6&E=&3'1&+'1#-&#,8$&('&2$&/--$-&
('&'1*&$#$0(*'",0&-,%(*,21(,'"&#,%(&&$JB/,#&7,8$&9':/8'+%8,&/(&&
B"':/8'+%8,KL,2060/
National Library of Canada Cataloguing in 
Publication Data
Main entry under title:
In service:10-8. -- Vol. 1, no. 1 (June 2001)-
Monthly.
Title from caption.
"A newsletter devoted to operational police 
officers across British Columbia."
ISSN 1705-5717 = In service, 10-8
1. Police - British Columbia - Periodicals.  2. 
Police – Legal status, laws, etc. – Canada – 
Cases – Periodicals. I. Justice Institute of British 
Columbia. Police Academy.  II. Title: In service, 
10-8.  III. Title: In service, ten - eight.
!"#$%&'#&()&*+,$!'
(!*$#'-./-01'2.--
!"#$% &'(#% )"*+,-"#.///% 01+%
2#343.1% 5'*(673"% 8..')3"43',%
'9% 513+9.% '9% :'*3)+;% 41+%
!3,3.4#&%'9%:(7*3)%<"9+4&%",-%
<'*3)34'#% =+,+#"*;% ",-% 41+%
>(.43)+% ?,.434(4+% '9% 2#343.1%
5'*(673";%:'*3)+%8)"-+6&%"#+%
1'.43,@% 41+% :'*3)+% A+"-+#.13B% CDEE% 5',9+#+,)+% 3,%
F",)'(G+#;% 2#343.1% 5'*(673"H% 013.% 3.% 5","-"I.% *"#@+.4%
B'*3)+% *+"-+#.13B% )',9+#+,)+% ",-% J3**% B#'G3-+% ",%
'BB'#4(,34&%9'#%-+*+@"4+.%4'%-3.)(..%*+"-+#.13B%4'B3).%
B#+.+,4+-%7&%J'#*-K#+,'J,+-%.B+"$+#.H%
333456789:7:;<:=>?8596@A:=:@9:496B
+C!!"*D'D,&'E()F&G
*&#(D$"H(#' +C*I$I(#'
J"*'!"#$%&'J(K$#$&+
!"#$%&'($%)$*+#&%,-%&#$%./0+$%*1%2,&%,3$'4,5$%.6%
5(147$8%2,&%-,(20%*2%&#$%+658%2,&%5$/1('$0%,2%/%
14/7$9% "#*1% )$*+#&% '$:(*'$1% /% 1&'$2+&#% /20%
4,20*&*,2*2+%-,'%)#*4#%-$)%,--*4$'1%/'$%&'/*2$09%"#$%
./0+$%*1%2,&%;(1&%<*22$0%,2%/%4#$1&8%*&%*1%<*22$0%,2%/%
7*-$1&67$9=%>%?,7*4$%@--*4$'
www.supportthebadge.ca
Note-able Quote
"A jury consists of twelve persons chosen to 
decide who has the better lawyer." - Robert Lee 
Frost.
DID YOU KNOW...
...that the Supreme Court of Canada took, on 
average, 7.4 months to render a judgment after they 
heard arguments on an appeal. For more information 
on other 2009 Supreme Court statistics see page 26.
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EVIDENCE OF MARIHUANA 
GROW OPERATION ADMISSIBLE 
DESPITE CHARTER BREACH
R. v. Ngai, 2010 ABCA 10
Police received a Crime Stoppers tip 
of suspicious activity at the accused’s 
home—no one appeared to live in 
the house, an Asian male driving  a 
Jaguar had visited the residence, the 
windows were covered, and there was condensation 
on basement windows and the back door. Physical 
reconnaissance was conducted and police saw 
corrugated plastic covering  the lower windows of 
the house and a brown stain running  down the 
siding. The accused’s phone number corresponded 
to a residence where other residents had been 
charged with drug  related offences. On request by 
police, a digital recording  ammeter (DRA) was 
attached to the electrical supply line for the house, 
which was outside the property line. The DRA 
recorded an approximate 18-hour cycling  pattern, 
consistent with a marijuana grow operation. The 
listed utilities subscriber for the residence was not 
the accused, but shared the same phone number. 
This listed subscriber did not appear to be a real 
person and was also the listed utilities subscriber for 
another residence which police had previously been 
searched and found to contain 778  marihuana 
plants. The police applied for and obtained a search 
warrant, locating  a 1,600 plant sophisticated grow 
operation within. 
At trial in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench the 
accused argued, among  other grounds, that the 
police violated his s.8 Charter right to be secure 
against unreasonable search or seizure because the 
DRA was installed without a warrant. He submitted 
that the definition of “customer information” in 
Alberta’s Code of Conduct Regulation (Regulation), 
enacted pursuant to the Electrical Utilities Act, 
permitted a utility to disclose data relating  to 
electrical consumption to the police, but such data 
did not include DRA information. Thus, in his view, 
the police required a warrant unless they had a 
customer’s consent. The Crown, on the other hand, 
contended that the legislation permitted the use of 
DRAs and external searches for information about 
the home which might give rise to an inference 
about what was going  on inside, depending  on other 
available evidence. Furthermore, the Crown 
suggested that there was no reasonable expectation 
of privacy in computerized electrical consumption 
records because they did not reveal intimate details 
about the personal life, lifestyle or private decisions 
of the occupant. The Crown did, however, concede 
that without the DRA evidence there would not be 
enough grounds to justify the issuance of the search 
warrant.
The trial judge ruled that the Regulation permitted 
the use of a DRA and concluded there was no 
invasion of privacy interests through its use. There 
was no breach of the Charter and the evidence 
obtained pursuant to the search warrant was 
admissible. The accused was convicted of unlawful 
possession and unlawful production of marihuana.
The accused then appealed to the Alberta Court of 
Appeal. Based on the Alberta Court of Appeal’s 
judgment in R. v. Gomboc, 2009 ABCA 276 (see 
Volume 10, Issue 1 of this publication), which had 
not been decided at the time this case originally 
went to trial, the Crown took the position that the 
information obtained from the DRA was subject to a 
reasonable expectation of privacy and using  it to 
collect the electrical data was an unreasonable 
search under the Charter. Furthermore, it agreed that 
the Regulation could not authorize the seizure of 
evidence in criminal matters in the absence of 
judicial authorization. Nonetheless, the Crown 
argued that the evidence was admissible under s.
24(2). 
The admissibility of evidence analysis under s.24(2) 
directs courts to balance the effect of admitting  the 
evidence on society’s confidence in the judicial 
system. This analysis consists of a three stage 
examination:
1. the seriousness of the Charter infringing  state 
conduct (admission may send the message the 
justice system condones serious state 
misconduct);
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2. the impact of the breach on the Charter 
protected interests of the accused (admission 
may send the message that individual rights 
count for little); and
3. society’s interest in the adjudication of the case 
on its merits.
Seriousness of the Charter infringement
In this case the police obtained the DRA information 
without a search warrant. However, at the time the 
warrant was obtained the requirement for a search 
warrant for DRA information was unsettled. The 
courts were divided as to whether or not a warrant 
was required and there was no definitive binding 
case law from either the Supreme Court of Canada 
or the Alberta Court of Appeal. As well, the police 
had noted many indicia consistent with the house 
being  utilized as a marijuana grown operation. Thus, 
the search was not egregious and was not a 
“suspicion-based search”. Instead, it was a 
retroactive warrantless search.
Impact on Charter protected interests
The house was not the accused’s residence. No one 
lived there and the the information revealed by the 
DRA did not reveal “any part of the biographical 
core of personal information” related to the accused. 
The use of the DRA information was minimally 
intrusive with respect to a building  that was not 
being utilized as the accused’s residence.
Society’s interest in adjudication 
The 1,600 marijuana plants was highly relevant and 
reliable evidence and its exclusion could undermine 
the truth-seeking  function of the justice system and 
render the trial unfair from the public perspective, 
thus bringing  the administration of justice into 
disrepute. The evidence was critical and virtually 
conclusive of guilt. And “the actions of the police 
did not represent a ‘brazen and flagrant’ disregard of 
the Charter,” said the Court. “Rather the police were 
attempting  to do their best in the face of legal 
uncertainty.” 
In admitting the evidence, the Court stated:
We conclude that the police conduct in this case 
was not egregious but rather at most consistent 
with one line of judicial authority as opposed to 
another, a situation compounded by the then 
conflicting  practices of the Provincial Court 
judges in Calgary. We also note that the DRA 
information in question did not relate to the 
[accused’s] residence nor did it reveal any part 
of his biographical core of personal information. 
Finally, the societal interest in seeking the truth 
and having  admitted into evidence strong, 
cogent and reliable evidence favours its 
admission. [para. 54]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed and his 
conviction was affirmed. 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
WARRANTLESS VEHICLE SEARCH 
PROPER AS INCIDENT TO 
ARREST
R. v. Tosczak, 2010 SKCA 10
Following  a routine traffic stop, a 
police officer approached the open 
driver's window of the vehicle and 
detected an odour of raw marijuana. 
He also detected a strong  smell of 
body spray, which he believed was used to mask 
the odour of marijuana. He obtained the accused’s 
driver's licence and registration, returned to the 
police car and ran the usual checks, found nothing 
untoward, and then returned to the accused’s 
vehicle. He leaned on the edge of the window, 
smelled a strong  odour of raw marijuana, and saw a 
can of spray deodorant on the floor. Believing  he 
had reasonable grounds to arrest the accused for 
possession of marijuana, he asked him if he had 
anything  illegal in the vehicle or on his person. The 
accused handed him a roach and he was arrested for 
possessing  marijuana. The officer conducted a pat-
down search and located a package of marijuana in 
the accused’s jacket. The accused was then placed in 
the police car and informed of his right to counsel. 
The officer then searched the interior of the vehicle, 
finding  a wooden stash container, a joint, another 
small roach, and a notebook he suspected contained 
entries of drug  transactions. He then opened the 
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trunk and unzipped a duffle bag  that smelled 
strongly of raw marijuana, finding  several ziploc 
bags of marijuana, another bag  of marijuana, and a 
set of scales. The accused was then informed he was 
now under arrest for possessing  marijuana for the 
purpose of trafficking  and again was informed of his 
right to counsel.
At trial in Saskatchewan Provincial Court the 
accused was convicted of possessing  marijuana for 
the purpose of trafficking  and sentenced to two years 
less a day (to be served in the community), his 
vehicle was forfeited, and he was prohibited from 
possessing  firearms for a period of ten years. The 
accused then appealed to the Saskatchewan Court of 
Appeal alleging  the trial judge failed to find that the 
police officer had violated his rights under ss.8 and 
10(b) of the Charter.
Search
Justice Cameron, authoring  the unanimous opinion 
of the Court, found the pat-down search of the 
accused’s person following  his arrest outside the 
vehicle amounted to a reasonable search because it 
was conducted lawfully and reasonably as a search 
incidental to a lawful arrest, as was the subsequent 
search of the vehicle. “The search of the vehicle, 
although conducted without warrant, was not 
unreasonable,” said Justice Cameron. “This search 
was ‘truly incidental’ to the lawful arrest of the 
[accused] for possession of marijuana.” He 
continued:
We say that because the police officer searched 
the vehicle almost immediately after the arrest 
and did so with a view to both discovering 
additional evidence and protecting evidence 
from destruction. Those were his purposes. And 
he believed that one or the other of them would 
be served by the search, a belief that was 
reasonable in the circumstances. In short, he 
was attempting to achieve a valid purpose 
connected to the arrest and had a reasonable 
basis for doing so. Hence, we share the view of 
the trial judge that the search of the vehicle was 
reasonable. [para. 10]
Right to Counsel 
The accused submitted that his initial detention 
under and for the purposes of Saskatchewan’s Traffic 
Safety Act turned into a drug-related investigative 
detention and, at that point, the police officer was 
required to inform him immediately of the reason for 
the detention and of his right to consult counsel. 
When the police officer returned to the accused’s 
vehicle following  the registration check, he believed 
he had reasonable grounds to arrest the accused and 
therefore the detention turned into a drug-related 
investigative detention and the officer was under a 
duty to comply with s.10(b) of the Charter before 
asking  whether the accused had anything  illegal in 
the vehicle and receiving the roach in response. 
Even assuming, without deciding, that the officer 
was required to advise the accused of his right to 
counsel as suggested by defence, the Court of 
Appeal would not set aside the conviction because 
the evidence discovered by the police officer during 
the search of the vehicle was nevertheless 
admissible under s.24(2) of the Charter. First, the 
evidence was not “obtained in a manner” that 
infringed the accused’s s.10 rights, for it was 
“difficult to see any meaningful nexus between such 
breach as may have occurred and the discovery of 
this evidence.” Second, having  regard for the revised 
approach to s.24(2) the evidence should not be 
excluded because its admission would not bring  the 
administration of justice into disrepute. “When this 
case arose, the case law was uncertain about what 
constitutes detention, was in a state of flux about 
whether the police had to comply with [s.]10 on 
investigative detentions, and was inaccurate about 
whether the police had to comply with [s.]10 
immediately or only after an appropriate interlude,” 
said Justice Cameron. “We also observe that the 
police officer in this case in fact complied with 
[s.]10 and did so in a manner he thought was 
consistent -- and indeed was consistent -- with the 
law as it stood at that time.” The accused’s appeal 
was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Check out archived issues of “In Service: 10-8” at www.10-8.ca
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VEHICLE SEARCH INCIDENT TO 
OFFENCE FOR WHICH DRIVER 
ARRESTED
R. v. Volk, 2010 SKCA 3
After stopping  the accused for 
speeding  past an emergency vehicle 
at 1:27 pm., a police officer 
approached the driver’s side of the 
car and immediately smelled raw 
cannabis marihuana emanating  from the interior of 
the vehicle. Meanwhile, his partner had approached 
the passenger side, engaged the passenger in 
conversation, and also smelled marihuana. The 
accused was told that he was being  stopped for a 
traffic violation and, on request, produced a license 
and registration. The two officers moved to the rear 
of the vehicle where they indicated to each other 
they had smelled marihuana coming  from the inside 
of the car. The officer asked the accused to exit the 
vehicle, and told him that marihuana could be 
smelled and that it was believed to be in the vehicle. 
The accused was arrested for transporting  a 
controlled substance and provided with his Charter 
rights and police warning  at 1:32 pm. The officer 
said he would be searching  the car. The accused 
indicated he wanted to contact a lawyer, but the 
officer did not allow it citing  safety and privacy 
concerns - even though he had a cell phone. The 
officer nonetheless asked the accused some 
quest ions about marihuana. The accused 
subsequently entered the car and produced three 
baggies weighing  21 grams. Police then fully 
searched the vehicle, including  the trunk, and found 
14.5 pounds of marihuana and 180 grams of 
psilocybin. The accused was re-arrested for 
possessing  marihuana for the purpose of trafficking 
and was again Chartered and warned. He was 
transported to the police detachment and given an 
opportunity to call counsel at about 2:37 pm.
At trial in the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench 
the judge found the initial stop for the traffic 
infraction was lawful. He believed the officers had 
smelled marihuana and held there were ample 
grounds for the arrest. Because of the odour the 
officers subjectively believed that the accused was in 
possession of marihuana and there were also 
objective grounds for this belief – the officer’s 
extensive experience and ability to distinguish 
between raw and smoked marihuana. As well, the 
officers independently came to this conclusion 
based on their interactions with the driver and the 
passenger. There was no need to advise the accused 
that he was being  detained for a drug  investigation 
as soon as the marihuana odour was detected. There 
were only five minutes between the stop and the 
arrest, during  which the accused was asked for his 
license and registration, told about the traffic 
violation, the officers conferred, and then returned 
to asked the accused to exit. 
The trial judge also ruled that the accused’s right to 
counsel had not been breached. The hour and 13 
minute delay was not inordinate considering  the 30 
kms. from the scene to the detachment. Nothing  was 
discovered during  this time and the search would 
have occurred in any event. And even if there was a 
breach, the evidence was still admissible under s.
24(2) of the Charter. The accused was convicted of 
having  marihuana and psilocybin in his possession 
for the purpose of trafficking  contrary to s.5(2) of the 
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and was 
sentenced to an 18-month conditional sentence 
order, a 10-year firearms prohibition, a DNA order, a 
forfeiture order, and a $100 victim surcharge. The 
accused then appealed to the Saskatchewan Court of 
Appeal submitting  his rights under ss. 8, 9 and 10 of 
the Charter  were breached and the evidence should 
have been excluded under s.24(2). 
Section 9
Justice Ottenbreit, writing  the opinion for the 
unanimous court, found there was no investigative 
detention:
It was common ground that the initial traffic stop 
was a valid one. It was not necessary for the 
police officer to immediately advise [the 
accused] upon smelling  the marihuana 
emanating from the vehicle that he was being 
detained for a drug investigation. The trial judge 
was correct in observing  that in the five minutes 
between the time of the stop and the arrest of 
[the accused] for transportation of marihuana, 
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the officers were dealing with the traffic stop 
element only and the investigation was 
converted into a drug investigation only after the 
officers consulted at the rear of [the accused’s] 
vehicle. [The police officer] immediately 
thereafter advised [the accused] that he believed 
that he had marihuana in the car and arrested 
him. [para. 14]
As for the arrest, it too was lawful. The accused 
conceded that there were objective reasonable 
grounds for the arrest and the subjective belief that 
the accused was in possession of marihuana was 
also present. “Both testified that they smelled what 
they believed to be raw marihuana in the vehicle 
and believed the vehicle was transporting 
marihuana,” said the Court. “The two officers had 
sufficient subjectively reasonable grounds for the 
initial arrest and, therefore, s. 9 of the Charter had 
not been breached and that the arrest was lawful.”
Section 8
Since the arrest was lawful, the search of the car was 
also lawful as an incident to the arrest:
[A] police officer has a common law right to 
search an arrested person incidental to that 
arrest. The officer does not require additional 
reasonable grounds, as the authority for the 
search is derived from the lawful arrest. This right 
to search includes a search of the surroundings 
and the seizure of anything found there. [para. 
16]
This common law search power also authorizes the 
warrantless search of a vehicle incident to a lawful 
arrest:
There was ample evidence before the trial judge 
by which he could conclude that the search of 
the vehicle was incident to [the accused’s] arrest 
and was therefore valid. The trial judge 
concluded, based on the overwhelming  smell of 
marihuana in the vehicle, that the officers 
subjectively believed [the accused] was liable to 
arrest and arrested him. The officers testified that 
it was their view that a search warrant was not 
necessary as the accused had been arrested. 
Upon arrest [the accused] was advised that the 
car would be searched. The search of the vehicle 
was clearly incident to the very offence for 
which he had been arrested. [para. 18]
Thus, there was no s.8 breach.
Section 10
Once the traffic stop was dealt with, the accused 
was immediately informed of why he was being 
arrested and given his rights to counsel and police 
warning. After the drugs were found in the trunk, he 
was re-arrested and given his rights again. He was 
promptly and appropriately informed of the reasons 
for his arrest and s.10(a) had not been breached.
However, s. 10(b) was breached by the police. After 
the accused requested to speak to counsel the 
officers asked him questions and attempted to elicit 
information from him about the drugs. The accused 
was diligent in communicating  his desire to talk to 
counsel and once he indicated that he wished to talk 
to counsel, any further questioning  should have 
been delayed until he had the opportunity to do so. 
“Because he could not contact counsel at the place 
of the police stop, it was incumbent on the police 
officers to first afford him these rights before 
questioning,” said the Court. However, despite the s.
10(b) right, there was no causal connection between 
the breach and the discovery of the drugs in the 
trunk. The search would have proceeded and the 
drugs would have been found in any event. The 
accused’s statements about drugs, and his 
subsequent retrieval of the baggies did not assist the 
officers in finding  the drugs in the trunk or prejudice 
his legal position in respect of those drugs. The 
police officers would have searched the vehicle after 
concluding  they had smelled marihuana emanating 
from it.
Section 24(2)
Despite the s.10(b) breach, the evidence was 
admissible. The only marihuana that was discovered 
as a result of the unlawfully obtained statement was 
21 grams of marihuana from the car. No statements 
led to the finding  of the marihuana and psilocybin in 
the trunk. In deciding  whether evidence is 
admissible under s. 24(2) a court must consider and 
balance: (1) the seriousness of the Charter infringing 
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state conduct; (2) the impact of the breach on the 
Charter protected interests of the accused; and (3) 
society’s interest in the adjudication of a case on its 
merits.
In this case, eliciting  information from the accused 
after he had indicated he wished to speak to a 
lawyer was a serious infringement of the accused’s s. 
10(b) right. The police officers were relatively 
experienced and presumably knew that the accused 
should be afforded an opportunity to speak to a 
lawyer before questioning  him. However, the 
evidence indicates that neither officer was abusive 
or acting  in bad faith and the questioning  was 
limited. The search incident to arrest was in good 
faith. 
As for the the impact of the s.10(b) breach on the 
Charter protected interests of the accused, it was at 
the lower end of the scale. “The drugs were not 
derivative evidence,” said Justice Ottenbeit. “There 
was no causal link between the drugs found in the 
trunk of the vehicle and the statement elicited from 
the accused. There is a lower expectation of privacy 
with respect to a vehicle than in a home since a 
driver knows that he may be stopped for reasons of 
highway safety. This was not a case where the 
dignity or personal integrity of the accused was 
breached.”
And finally, society’s interest in the adjudication of 
the case favoured admission: 
The drugs found are not derivative evidence. The 
evidence is real or physical and the reliability of 
the evidence in this case is therefore 
unquestioned. The drugs formed almost the 
entirety of the case and were of crucial 
importance to the Crown’s case. In our view, the 
exclusion of the drugs in this case may impact 
negatively on the repute of the administration of 
justice. The public interest in having a trial 
adjudicated on its merits is high and favours
admission. [para. 30]
The evidence was admissible and the accused’s 
appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
TRUTH IN SENTENCING ACT 
GETS GREEN LIGHT
Effective February 22, 2010 Bill C-25, Canada’s Truth 
in Sentencing Act came into force. This Act amends 
the Criminal Code to specify the extent to which a 
court may take into account time spent in custody 
by an offender before sentencing. Now, under s.
719(3) of the Criminal Code, a judge shall limit any 
credit for time spent in custody to a maximum of 
one day for each day spent in custody. However, 
under s.719(3.1) a court may give one and a half 
(1½) days for each day spent in custody if the 
circumstances justify it. A judge is also required to 
give reasons on the record for any credit granted and 
there are some changes to filling  out the warrant of 
committal to reflect sentences imposed and the 
credit given.
Replaced by:
Former s.719 (3) Criminal Code - In  determining the 
sentence to be imposed on a person convicted of an 
offence, a court may take into account any time spent 
in custody by the person as a result of the offence.
New provision - s.719(3) In determining  the sentence 
to be imposed on a person convicted of an offence, a 
court may take into account any time spent in custody 
by the person as a result of the offence but the court 
shall limit any credit for that time to a maximum of one 
day for each day spent in custody.
(3.1) Despite subsection  (3), if the circumstances justify 
it, the maximum is one and one-half days for each day 
spent in custody unless the reason for detaining  the 
person in custody was stated in the record under 
subsection 515(9.1) or the person was detained in 
custody under subsection 524(4) or (8).
(3.2) The court shall give reasons for any credit granted 
and shall cause those reasons to be stated in the 
record.
(3.3) The court shall cause to be stated in the record 
and on the warrant of committal the offence, the 
amount of time spent in  custody, the term of 
imprisonment that would have been imposed before 
any credit was granted, the amount of time credited, if 
any, and the sentence imposed.
(3.4) Failure to comply with subsection (3.2) or (3.3) 
does not affect the validity of the sentence imposed by 
the court.
Volume 10 Issue 2 - March/April 2010
PAGE 9
ENTRAPMENT: LEGITIMATE 
INVESTIGATION DID NOT 
PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY TO 
COMMIT CRIME
R. v. Imoro, 2010 ONCA 122
After receiving  an anonymous tip 
that a man was selling  drugs on the 
12th floor of an apartment building, 
police decided to investigate and an 
undercover officer went to the 
apartment building  and took the elevator to the 12th 
floor. When the elevator doors opened, the accused 
approached the officer and said, “Come with 
me.”  The officer responded, “You can hook me 
up?”  and the accused answered, “Yeah man.” He 
led the officer and another man, who had been on 
the elevator with the officer, to his apartment. Once 
inside, the accused sold some marijuana to the 
other man and then asked the officer what he 
needed.  The officer said “hard”, meaning  crack 
cocaine, but the accused said that he had only 
“soft”, meaning  powdered cocaine.  The officer 
asked for $40 worth and was provided with a bag  of 
cocaine from some prepackaged supplies.  The 
officer used police ‘buy money’ to make the deal. 
The next day, the officer went back and the accused 
opened the door, greeted the officer, and sold him 
another $40 worth of cocaine. Police then obtained 
a search warrant for the apartment and seized 
cocaine, mari juana, and the police ‘buy 
money’. The accused was arrested and charged with 
two counts each of trafficking  in cocaine, possessing 
controlled substances (cocaine and marijuana) for 
the purpose of trafficking, and possessing  proceeds 
of crime. 
In court, the accused plead not guilty, claimed 
entrapment, and brought a motion to exclude the 
evidence or stay the proceedings.  The Ontario 
Superior Court Justice concluded that the conduct of 
the undercover officer amounted to entrapment. She 
found entrapment occurred at the time of the initial 
contact between the undercover officer and the 
accused. The officer’s question, “Can you hook me 
up?” was the first reference to drugs raised by the 
officer (the accused made no prior offer), amounted 
Domestic Violence
“Domestic violence is different from other crimes 
because the victim usually has had, or is currently 
in, an intimate relationship with the abuser. 
Domestic violence is a power-based crime, most 
often based on gender. The power and control 
dynamics make this crime particularly dangerous 
for the victim and uniquely challenging for the 
justice system. The likelihood of repeat violence 
is high; the abuser is known ahead of time; the 
victim’s ties with the abuser are complex, 
typically not ending with intervention; and often 
the victim’s fears of proceeding result in 
retractions of her initial report. Furthermore, 
whenever the woman has dependent children, 
any risk to the mother is a risk to the children. 
Given victims’ particular vulnerability at this 
time, it is crucial to take into account issues of 
cultural or other forms of diversity that may 
make it especially challenging for victims to 
access services to keep them and their children 
safe.” Domestic Violence Response: A Community 
Framework for Maximizing Women’s Safety, 
developed by Victim Services and Crime 
Prevention Division, Ministry of Public Safety and 
Solicitor General, ( January 2010), at p. 1. 
www.pssg.gov.bc.ca/victim_services/publications/docs/domestic-
violence-response.pdf
REsearchportsviews
Note-able Quote
"Above all, I would teach him to tell the truth ... 
Truth-telling, I have found, is the key to 
responsible citizenship. The thousands of criminals 
I have seen in 40 years of law enforcement have 
had one thing in common: Every single one was a 
liar.” - J. Edgar Hoover
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to giving  the accused an opportunity to sell drugs 
and was done when the officer did not have 
reasonable suspicion that the accused was engaged 
in drug  trafficking. The trial judge then excluded the 
seized drugs and buy money under s.24(2) of the 
Charter and the accused was acquitted.
The Crown then argued before the Ontario Court of 
Appeal that the trial judge erred in finding  that the 
accused was entrapped by police into committing 
drug trafficking offences. 
Entrapment
Although the police must have 
considerable leeway in the 
t e ch n i q u e s t h e y u s e t o 
investigate criminal activity - 
especially consensual crimes 
such as drug  trafficking  where 
traditional techniques may be 
ineffective - their powers of 
i nve s t i ga t i on canno t be 
un t rammeled .  Thus , t he 
doctrine of entrapment reflects 
j u d i c i a l d i s a p p r o va l o f 
u n a c c e p t a b l e p o l i c e o r 
prosecutorial conduct in 
investigating  crimes.  “In their 
efforts to investigate, deter and 
repress crime, the police 
should not be permitted to 
randomly test the virtue of citizens, or to offer 
citizens an opportunity to commit a crime without 
reasonable suspicion that they are already engaging 
in criminal activity, or worse, to go further and use 
tactics designed to induce citizens to commit a 
criminal offence,” said Justice Laskin, writing  the 
Court of Appeal’s opinion.  “To allow any of these 
investigative techniques would offend our notions of 
decency and fair play.” 
Entrapment can occur in two ways:
1. when the police, acting  without reasonable 
suspicion or for an improper purpose, provide 
a person with an opportunity to commit an 
offence. To make out entrapment under this 
prong  the court must find that the police 
provided an opportunity to commit an offence 
and that they did so without reasonable 
suspicion. 
2. even having  reasonable suspicion or acting  in 
the course of a good faith inquiry, the police 
go beyond providing  an opportunity to commit 
a crime and actually induce the commission of 
an offence.
When entrapment is found 
“the court will not allow the 
C r o w n t o m a i n t a i n a 
conviction because to do so 
would be an abuse of process 
and bring  the administration of 
justice in disrepute.” A claim of 
entrapment involves a two-
s tage t r ia l . Because the 
doctrine of entrapment does 
n o t p u t t h e a c c u s e d ’s 
culpability into issue, but the 
conduct of the state, the judge 
(or jury) must first determine 
whether the accused is guilty 
of the crime (has the Crown 
discharged i ts burden of 
proving  beyond a reasonable 
doubt all the essential elements 
of the offence?) If the accused 
is guilty then the judge moves 
to the second stage to consider 
entrapment. If the claim of entrapment is successful 
the standard remedy is for a court to enter a stay of 
proceedings.
Although the officer did not have a reasonable 
suspicion that the accused was engaged in drug 
trafficking  when the officer asked “Can you hook me 
up?”, Justice Laskin found the question did not 
provide the accused with an opportunity to sell 
drugs.  Here the trial judge erred in properly 
distinguishing  “between legitimately investigating  a 
tip and giving an opportunity to commit a crime”:
By the question “Can you hook me up?” all the 
officer really asked [the accused] was whether 
he was a drug dealer. The question was simply a 
step in the police’s investigation of the 
“In their efforts to investigate, 
deter and repress crime, the police 
should not be permitted to 
randomly test the virtue of citizens, 
or to offer citizens an opportunity 
to commit a crime without 
reasonable suspicion that they are 
already engaging in criminal activity, 
or worse, to go further and use 
tactics designed to induce citizens 
to commit a criminal offence. To 
allow any of these investigative 
techniques would offend our 
notions of decency and fair play.”  
Volume 10 Issue 2 - March/April 2010
PAGE 11
anonymous tip.  It did not amount to giving [the 
accused] an opportunity to traffic in drugs.   That 
opportunity was given later when the officer and 
his fellow passenger in the elevator were inside 
[the accused’s] apartment. By then, having 
observed a drug  transaction between [the 
accused] and the other man, the officer certainly 
had reasonable suspicion – indeed virtually 
certain belief – that [the accused] was engaged 
in drug trafficking. [para. 16]
Thus, no entrapment occurred, the acquittals were 
set aside, verdicts of guilty were entered, and the 
case was returned to the trial court for sentencing. 
And although the Ontario Court of Appeal refused to 
decide whether a remedy of exclusion under s.24(2) 
of the Charter was appropriate on a finding  of 
entrapment, it tended to agree with the Crown’s 
submission that resort to s.24(2) distorted the 
underpinnings of the entrapment doctrine:
... I think the Crown’s contention has merit. A 
court considers s. 24(2) of the Charter where the 
state has improperly obtained evidence of an 
offence. A court considers entrapment where the 
accused alleges the state has improperly brought 
about the commission of the offence. Under s. 
24(2), the court must determine whether the 
admission of the evidence would compromise 
the fairness of the trial.  On a claim of 
entrapment, the court does not consider the 
fairness of the trial, but instead whether it was 
fair that there was a trial.  These considerations 
suggest that a s. 24(2) remedy is ill-suited for a 
finding of entrapment. [para. 28]
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
GOING BEYOND BARE DUTIES 
DOES NOT NECESSARILY 
VIOLATE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
R. v. Wolbeck, 2010 ABCA 65
After seeing  a vehicle cut a “donut” 
on a gravel road, a county constable 
followed the vehicle and pulled it 
over. The accused had glassy eyes, 
slurred speech and was rummaging 
through some documents. When asked, he said that 
he had consumed alcohol. The accused was 
Chartered and cautioned, indicated he understood 
his rights, and said he wanted to call a lawyer. The 
county constable called the RCMP and an RCMP 
officer arrived about 10-15 minutes later. He 
approached the accused, advised him that he was 
conducting  an impaired driving  investigation, and 
formed the opinion that the accused had been 
operating  a motor vehicle while impaired. The 
accused was arrested, read the breathalyzer 
demand, and given the various cautions. He asserted 
his right to counsel, was transported to the police 
detachment, and was placed in a telephone room. 
As requested, the officer dialed the number for legal 
aid and handed the phone to the accused, who was 
left in the phone room to complete his telephone 
conversation in private. He subsequently provided 
breath samples and was charged with impaired care 
or control and over 80mg%. 
At trial in Alberta Provincial Court the accused did 
not testify. The judge found that the accused had 
asked the officer to assist in contacting  Legal Aid. 
There was no evidence that the accused did not 
want to call Legal Aid and wanted to call someone 
else. He had the opportunity to use a telephone 
book and to tell police if he was having  problems 
contacting  his counsel of choice. There was no s.
10(b) Charter breach and the results of the breath 
tests and certificate of analysis were admitted. The 
accused was convicted under s.253(b), over 80mg%. 
The impaired charge under s.253 was stayed.
On appeal to the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench 
the accused was acquitted. The appeal judge 
concluded that the accused’s right to contact 
Section Twenty-Four Two Review
24. (1) Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this 
Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of 
competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court 
considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.
(2) Where, in proceedings under subsection (1), a court 
concludes that evidence was obtained in a manner that 
infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by this 
Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is established that, 
having regard to all the circumstances, the admission of it in the 
proceedings would bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute.
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counsel had been violated. The results of the breath 
tests and certificate of analysis were excluded under 
s.24(2) and a new trial was ordered on the impaired 
driving charge, which had been stayed. 
The Crown’s appeal to the Alberta Court of Appeal 
arguing, among  other things, that there was no s.
10(b) breach was successful. “Once the Crown has 
shown that the accused had a reasonable 
opportunity to consult counsel, the burden of 
proving  a Charter breach is on the accused, on a 
balance of probabilities,” said the Court. 
Right to Counsel
The three member Alberta Court of Appeal 
summarized the duties of police with respect to the 
rights of a detained person to consult counsel as 
follows:
(a) to inform the detainee of his or her right to 
retain and instruct counsel without delay and 
of the existence and availability of Legal Aid 
and duty counsel; 
(b) if a detainee has indicated a desire to 
exercise this right, to provide the detainee 
with a reasonable opportunity to exercise the 
right (except in urgent and dangerous 
circumstances); and 
(c) to refrain from eliciting  evidence from the 
detainee until he or she has had that 
reasonable opportunity (again, except in 
cases of urgency or danger). 
The first duty is called the “informational” duty, 
and the last two are called 
“implementational” duties. 
The implementational duties 
only come into play if the 
detained person indicates a 
desire to contact counsel. The 
detained person must be 
diligent in exercising  his rights 
to counsel, and he may waive 
h i s r i g h t s a n d m a k e a 
statement to the police. The 
burden of proving  waiver is 
on the Crown. [references 
omitted, para. 20]
In this case the informational 
duty was discharged. There was no suggestion the 
accused was not advised of his right to counsel or of 
the availability of Legal Aid. He was then placed in a 
room with a telephone, a telephone book, 
information about Legal Aid, and he was given an 
opportunity to consult counsel in private. This 
discharged the relevant implementational duty of 
providing  a reasonable opportunity to exercise the 
right: 
Once the police have discharged their 
informational and implementational duties they 
are entitled to take a passive role with respect to 
the accused’s right to counsel. But merely 
because the police go further than their bare 
duties does not automatically mean that there is 
an infringement of the accused’s right to 
counsel. Further involvement by the police, or 
gratuitous assistance rendered to the accused in 
exercising the right to counsel, does not equate 
to a breach of the Charter right. “Assistance” or 
“involvement” are not the same thing  as 
“ in te r fe rence” or “ in f r ingement” . The 
determination of whether the involvement of the 
police is “interference” or “assistance” is one 
best left to the [judge] as it will be highly 
dependent on the circumstances in each case. 
Even though the police only have the 
informational and implementational duties 
mentioned, it does not follow that they must 
desist from providing any assistance to the 
accused in his or her attempts to contact 
counsel. ... There is no Charter prohibition on 
the police assisting  an accused in contacting 
counsel, only a prohibition on the police 
interfering with the right to 
contact counsel. That the 
p o l i c e p r o v i d e d s o m e 
assistance (whether requested 
or not) is a neutral factor 
unless there is evidence of 
interference in the right to 
contact counsel. There is no 
such evidence on this record. 
Specif ically, there is no 
evidence that the police 
contrived in some way to 
make the [accused] consult 
Legal Aid rather than some 
other counsel. Indeed there is 
n o e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e 
“Once the police have discharged 
their informational and 
implementational duties they are 
entitled to take a passive role with 
respect to the accused’s right to 
counsel. But merely because the 
police go further than their bare 
duties does not automatically 
mean that there is an infringement 
of the accused’s right to counsel.”  
Volume 10 Issue 2 - March/April 2010
PAGE 13
[accused] ever had any intention to consult 
anyone other than Legal Aid. [paras. 22-23]
Here, there was no 
evidence to support a 
Charter breach. There 
was nothing  to suggest 
the accused wanted to 
call someone other 
than Legal Aid. Nor 
was there any evidence 
that his handcuffs in 
any way impeded his 
ability to talk to Legal Aid on the telephone, or to 
use the telephone book or telephone. The accused 
requested assistance in contacting  Legal Aid, but the 
officer did not take over this personal right. Nor was 
there any evidence that the accused wanted or 
intended to “look through a telephone book or 
consider his options”, nor was his right to choose 
counsel in any way restricted. “The burden of 
proving  an actual, not just a theoretical, breach of a 
Charter right is on the accused,” said the Court. 
“Mere assistance or involvement by the police in 
contacting  counsel is not interference with  the right 
to counsel.” 
As well, “the police do not need ‘any reasonable 
belief that [an accused] was unable to contact 
counsel personally’” before they offer or provide 
assistance. Nor is providing  assistance “taking  over” 
the right unless the accused’s personal will is 
overborne by the police and his attempts to contact 
counsel thwarted. The accused could have simply 
declined any assistance. And even if the officer had 
suggested that the accused contact Legal Aid, this 
was one of his informational duties. “It cannot be a 
breach of the [accused’s] Charter right for the officer 
to discharge his duties under the Charter.” Finally, 
there was no evidence of any lack of privacy that 
interfered with the ability to contact counsel. Since 
there was no s.10(b) Charter violation there was no 
need to consider s.24(2). The appeal was allowed 
and the over 80mg% conviction was restored. 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
COURT TO CONSIDER OF 
CHARTER BREACH PATTERN IN 
DECIDING ADMISSIBILITY
R. v. Lauriente, 2010 BCCA 72
After receiving  a Crimestoppers tip 
about a grow operation located on a 
five acre rural property owned by the 
accused Mr. Lauriente and occupied 
by him, his wife and two children, 
police undertook a week long  investigation. During 
the investigation, the lead police investigator 
trespassed on the property and made some 
observations which were consistent with the 
property being  used for a grow operation. She also 
directed that Mr.  Lauriente be stopped. A 
photograph of Mr. Lauriente was surreptitiously 
taken for surveillance purposes and other 
in format ion was obta ined to fur ther the 
investigation. A search warrant was obtained and Mr. 
Lauriente was arrested in a vehicle as he left the 
property just prior to the execution of the 
warrant. The accused Catalano was found standing 
among  marijuana plants in an outbuilding  on the 
property which also contained various paraphernalia 
consistent with a marijuana grow operation.  He was 
advised of his right to counsel and indicated his 
wish to speak with a lawyer. However, before he 
was provided with a reasonable opportunity to do 
so, the accused Catalano  was asked if he had any 
identification on him and for the keys to the truck 
which was parked outside. He pointed to a jacket on 
a nearby chair. The officer found keys to the truck 
and to the building  housing  the grow operation in 
the jacket pocket. The accused’s wife, Ms. Lauriente, 
was arrested inside the residence.  The evidence 
included 64 marijuana plants and associated grow 
operation paraphernalia, hydro records, cash, and 
other items.
At trial in British Columbia Supreme Court, charges 
against Ms. Lauriente were stayed by Crown. And 
the trial judge found several Charter breaches. First, 
the judge concluded that the trespass amounted to a 
breach of s.8. The judge also found that the highway 
stop was not based on any concern for highway 
safety but was a ruse by the police to enable further 
“The burden of 
proving an actual, 
not just a theoretical, 
breach of a Charter 
right is on the 
accused.”  
www.10-8.ca
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information to be gained in relation to the 
investigation. The stop was arbitrary and violated s.9. 
As well, the detention during  the highway stop 
involved a breach of s.10(a) - the right to be advised 
of the reason for detention. Further, the trial judge 
found that questioning  Catalano after he had 
asserted his right to counsel, but before he had a 
chance to exercise it, was a breach of his rights 
under s.10(b) of the Charter. Finally, although the 
charges against Ms. Lauriente were stayed during  the 
trial, the judge also found that her s.9 Charter right 
was breached in that the police did not have 
reasonable grounds to arrest her when they executed 
the warrant. Although the trial judge nonetheless 
upheld the validity of the search warrant, the 
evidence was excluded under s.24(2) and acquittals 
of producing  marijuana and possession for the 
purpose of trafficking followed. 
The Crown appealed the acquittals to the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal and sought a new trial, 
arguing  the evidence should not have been 
excluded. In the Crown’s view, the trial judge erred 
in applying  s.24(2) of the Charter by (1) failing  to 
consider the question of “standing” and giving  each 
accused standing  to rely on the breaches of the 
other’s Charter rights (including  Ms. Lauriente) and 
(2) failing  to consider whether there was a sufficient 
temporal or causal nexus between the breaches of 
Charter rights found, and the evidence obtained as a 
result of the search, to justify excluding  that 
evidence on a s.24(2) analysis. But the Court of 
Appeal disagreed.
Standing
Because each of the accuseds’ Charter rights were 
breached, each of them had standing  to seek the 
e x c l u s i o n o f e v i d e n c e p u r s u a n t t o s . 
24(2). Therefore, the trial judge did not give standing 
to each of the accuseds to seek a Charter remedy 
based on breaches of the rights of a third party. As 
well, in determining  the seriousness of the individual 
breaches and whether the admission of the evidence 
could bring  the administration of justice into 
disrepute, the court was entitled to take into account 
the pattern of Charter breaches during  the course of 
the investigation and search, and their cumulative 
effect. Had the accused Catalano been arrested in 
circumstances where his Charter rights had not been 
breached, he would have no standing  to seek 
Charter relief; only the accused Mr. Lauriente would 
have such standing  based on the breaches of his 
Charter rights. But Catalano’s rights were breached 
as well. 
[B]oth Mr. Lauriente and Mr. Catalano had 
standing to seek relief pursuant to s. 24(2) of the 
Charter based on the infringement of their 
individual Charter rights.  Mr. Lauriente’s rights 
under s. 8, 9, and 10(a) had been infringed; Mr. 
Catalano’s rights under s. 10(b) had been 
infringed.  This was simply not a case of an 
accused who had no standing seeking to rely on 
the breach of a third party’s Charter rights in 
order to obtain standing. ...
I turn, then, to the use the trial judge did make 
of the cumulative effect of the breaches of the 
respondents’ Charter rights.  It is apparent from 
her reasons that she relied on the cumulative 
effect of the breaches of the rights of Mr. 
Lauriente and Mr. Catalano (and, to a lesser 
extent, the breach of Ms. Lauriente’s s. 9 Charter 
right) as evidencing a pattern of disregard of 
Charter rights by the police during the course of 
the investigation, and in their execution of the 
warrant.  In that respect, she properly considered 
the cumulative effect of the breaches as relevant 
to a determination of the seriousness of the 
breaches, and in relation to the question of 
whether the admission of the evidence obtained 
in relation to those breaches could bring  the 
administration of justice into disrepute. ... [paras. 
26-27]
Nor did the fact that the cumulative effect of the 
Charter breaches involve more that one accused 
undermine the trial judge’s analysis:
This case involved one investigation in which 
the police overstepped the law in several 
instances evidencing a pattern of disregard of 
Charter rights which the trial judge found to be 
serious.  She specifically found that each of the 
individual Charter breaches were serious, albeit 
not at the extreme end of the range, or reflecting 
bad faith on the part of the police.  If she had 
considered the breaches individually, as if they 
had occurred in a vacuum, or in circumstances 
which were otherwise unremarkable, she may 
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have concluded that the serious remedy of the 
exclusion of evidence was not warranted; that is, 
that the admission of the evidence obtained 
t he reby cou ld no t have b rough t t he 
administration of justice into disrepute. But these 
breaches did not occur in a vacuum, they 
occurred in the context of a relatively brief 
inves t iga t ion where each s tep in the 
investigation followed and built on the prior 
step, ultimately culminating in the obtaining and 
execution of the search warrant which led to the 
respondents’ (and Ms. Lauriente’s) arrest, and the 
further breach of Mr. Catalano’s right to counsel.  
In my view, the trial judge was entitled to have 
regard to all of these breaches, both in placing 
the seriousness of the individual breaches in 
context, and, more particularly, in determining 
whether this pattern of disregard of the Charter 
by the authorities could bring the administration 
of justice into disrepute. [para. 30]
Nexus
The required nexus between the particular Charter 
breaches relating  to each accused and the evidence 
sought to be excluded was present. In order for s.
24(2) to apply there is a two stage analysis. The first 
is a threshold requirement; were the Charter 
breaches sufficiently linked to the evidence sought 
to be excluded?   If this is satisfied, then the second 
stage (the evaluative component of s.24(2)) is 
triggered – could the admission of the evidence 
bring the administration of justice into disrepute?
There was a sufficient link between the breaches and 
the evidence. “The fact that the validity of the 
warrant was ultimately upheld did not sever the 
connection between the breach and the impugned 
evidence,” said Justice Prowse delivering  the Court 
of Appeal judgment:
Here, the warrantless perimeter search of Mr. 
Lauriente’s property, and the highway stop of his 
vehicle for the purpose of taking his photograph 
and gathering further information from him, 
were tactical investigative methods chosen by 
the police to further the investigation which 
were sufficiently temporally linked to the 
evidence discovered upon execution of the 
warrant to justify the trial judge in moving  to the 
second stage of the s. 24(2) analysis. 
[I]t is also apparent that the breach of Mr. 
Catalano’s s. 10(b) right was temporally 
connected with the discovery of the evidence in 
issue.   It is not an answer for the Crown to say 
that the evidence would have been discovered 
in any event; that is an issue which arises at the 
second stage of the s. 24(2) analysis, not at the 
first stage, where the only issue is whether there 
is a temporal connection or other sufficient 
nexus between the fact of the breach and the 
finding of the evidence.   There can be no doubt 
that such a connection existed here with respect 
to Mr. Catalano. [paras. 49-50]
The Crown’s appeal was dimissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
SEARCH WARRANT REFUSAL 
NOT BINDING ON OFFICER’S 
GROUNDS TO ARREST 
R. v. Bacon, Cheng & Burton, 2010 BCCA 135
The police set up surveillance after 
receiving  several complaints from 
neighbours about frequent short 
visits by vehicles coming  and going 
at all hours to a townhouse, 
occupied by the accused’s Bacon and Burton. 
Police saw about 15 transactions over a week, which 
the police suspected were drug  related, taking  place 
at and from the townhouse.  Satisfied that the 
residence was being  used as a drug  transfer house 
police applied for a warrant to search the 
premises. A Judicial Justice of the Peace (JJP) refused 
the warrant, indicating  that the materials fell “short 
of supporting  reasonable grounds to believe that the 
items to be searched for will be at the requested 
location”. While revising  his material for a further 
warrant application, the lead investigator received a 
call from his police surveillance team, who reported 
seeing  another transaction between Bacon and 
Cheng; they transferred packages between vehicles 
and drove to a meeting  point. The lead investigator 
instructed the team to arrest Bacon and Cheng, who 
were in Cheng’s vehicle. On arrest, the vehicle was 
searched and resulted in the seizure of one-half 
pound of marihuana, 92 methamphetamine pills, 15 
ecstasy pills, 4 packages of cocaine, $2,600 in cash, 
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a score sheet, cell phones and a Blackberry. Shortly 
after the arrest, Burton quickly drove away from the 
townhouse. The police stopped and arrested her and 
seized $88,000 from her vehicle. A subsequent 
search warrant application for the townhouse, 
supported by the seizures incidental to arrest, was 
successful. A search of the townhouse turned up 24 
pounds of pre-packaged marihuana, score sheets, a 
quantity of cash, four firearms (two automatic and 
two semi-automatic), illegal ammunition, silencers, 
a bulletproof vest, a police uniform, and a police 
scanner.
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court on a 15 
count information charging  drugs and weapons 
offences the accuseds were acquitted. The judge 
found the arrest to be unlawful and excluded the 
evidence seized incidental to the arrest. He found 
that the lead investigator did not have the requisite 
subjective belief that there were reasonable grounds 
that Bacon and Cheng  had committed an 
offence. He excluded the evidence taken incidental 
to the arrest under s.24(2) as a remedy for breaches 
of ss.8  and 9 of the Charter. He also found the 
search warrant to be invalid, having  excised the 
evidence obtained at the arrest.  The evidence 
gathered pursuant to the search warrant was also 
excluded.
The Crown then challenged the trial judge’s rulings 
to the British Columbia Court of Appeal  arguing  the 
rejection of the prior search warrant application was 
not binding  on the police so 
as to render the ar res t 
unlawful. The Crown also 
submitted that the trial judge 
took the wrong  approach in 
reviewing  the validity of the 
warrant. The accuseds, on the 
other hand, contended that 
the judge found an absence of 
subjective grounds as a result 
of the lead investigator’s 
incredible belief, not on the 
history of the warrant process. 
Justice Donald, writing  the 
opinion for the Court of 
Appeal, said that “[i]f the 
arrest of Bacon and Cheng  was lawful, the product 
of the incidental search unquestionably provided an 
adequate basis for a valid search warrant of the 
townhouse”. But here, the trial judge held that the 
lead investigator could not have held an honest 
belief in reasonable grounds because the first 
warrant application failed. Since the JJP  did not find 
the 15 prior transactions sufficient, one more of the 
same kind of thing  (the Bacon/Cheng  exchange) was 
not going  to make any difference. The judge 
erroneously treated the JJP’s warrant refusal as a 
binding  pronouncement such that it was not open to 
the lead investigator to believe that he had grounds 
to authorize an arrest. So the trial judge either erred 
by finding  the officer could not form a belief 
contrary to the JJP’s refusal, despite the officer’s 
actual state of mind, or by conflating  the analysis of 
subjective grounds with objective grounds.
In this case, however, the lead investigator testified 
that he believed he had grounds to arrest. “In the 
absence of an adverse credibility finding, it must be 
taken that [the lead investigator] genuinely held the 
belief,” said Justice Donald:
The JJP’s decision disposed of a discrete 
application but it did not bind anyone.  The 
police could have applied again on the same 
material to a Provincial Court judge who would 
have been free to make a de novo decision 
without regard for the JJP’s view of the material. 
It follows that the refusal could not have 
disqualified the officer’s belief 
in the grounds of arrest.  The 
officer was not obliged to alter 
his belief to conform with the 
JJP’s opinion.  The validity of 
the arrest had to be judged 
according  to ... the presence of 
a sub jec t ive be l i e f and 
o b j e c t i v e l y r e a s o n a b l e 
grounds.  [references omitted, 
paras. 19-20]
Because the Court of Appeal 
ordered a new trial they did not 
engage in a close analysis of the 
objective grounds justifying  the 
arrests. However, Justice Donald 
“It follows that the [search 
warrant] refusal could not have 
disqualified the officer’s belief in 
the grounds of arrest. The officer 
was not obliged to alter his belief 
to conform with the JJP’s 
opinion. The validity of the arrest 
had to be judged according to ... 
the presence of a subjective belief 
and objectively reasonable 
grounds.”  
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did state that “there is a body of evidence upon 
which a reasonable finding  of objective grounds 
could be made.”  
As for the validity of the search warrant, the trial 
judge erred in setting  it aside. Rather than 
invalidating  the warrant because of certain 
objectionable features, he was required “to strip 
away the objectionable features and examine the 
sufficiency of what remained.” And although there 
may be a residual discretion to strike down a 
warrant for abuse of process, the alleged mistakes in 
this case were a long  way from such an abuse. The 
Crown’s appeal was allowed, the acquittals were set 
aside, and a new trial was ordered. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
COMMON LAW ALLOWS POLICE 
TO TOW UNINSURED VEHICLE
R. v. Waugh, 2010 ONCA 100
The accused was charged with two 
counts of obstructing  the same peace 
officer. During  the first incident, the 
officer was on foot patrol when he 
observed a rusted Pontiac vehicle 
that appeared to be in poor condition and did not 
have a front licence plate. He instructed the accused 
to stop and pull over. The accused was unable to 
produce a driver’s licence, a valid vehicle permit, or 
proof of valid insurance. Believing  the vehicle was 
uninsured, the accused was told that the vehicle 
would be impounded and a tow truck was 
summoned. A CPIC search revealed the accused had 
three previous convictions for operating  a vehicle 
without insurance. The accused refused to get out of 
the car.  Instead, he locked himself in and asked that 
a supervisor be called.  While waiting  for a 
supervisor the accused was served with several 
provincial offence notices.  He started the car and 
began to drive away.  Pursued by the police, he 
ultimately turned off the road and parked the car in 
a private laneway about 150 to 250 metres away 
from the point where he had been stopped. Because 
the vehicle was parked on private property and not 
on a highway, the police were unable to tow it. The 
accused was then charged with the offence of 
obstructing  police on the basis that he had failed to 
follow the police instructions not to move the 
vehicle and had prevented them from properly 
towing it.
During  the second incident, the officer was again on 
foot patrol when he noticed a vehicle approaching 
that appeared to be in poor condition – it was 
rusted, the suspension was not proper, and the 
vehicle was leaning  to one side – and it lacked a 
front licence plate. He signalled for the vehicle to 
stop but it didn’t when initially requested to do so.  
As the officer approached the vehicle to instruct the 
driver to pull over, the accused put the vehicle in 
motion, veered to the right, drove around the officer, 
and proceeded along  the street.  The officer 
repeatedly called for the accused to stop, but he 
proceeded to turn into a laneway designated as a fire 
route.  Eventually, the accused did stop, but not 
before driving  within an arm’s length of the police 
officer who was tapping  on the hood telling  him to 
stop. The accused was able to produce a valid 
driver’s licence and vehicle ownership permit, but 
not proof of insurance. Because the accused’s 
vehicle validation sticker was insured by a company 
– “Your Own Insurance Company” – that did not 
exist, the officer informed the accused that his 
licence plate (a dealer plate displayed inside the rear 
window) would be seized and the car would be 
impounded. After a tow truck was called, the 
accused, with some resistance, got out of the vehicle 
through the passenger side door and then quickly 
slammed it. He locked the keys inside the car, 
preventing  the police from seizing  his licence plate.  
Again, he was arrested for the offence of obstructing 
police.
At trial the accused explained that during  the first 
incident he thought he was free to drive off once he 
he had received the offence notices. The judge, 
however, rejected this evidence and convicted the 
accused of obstructing  police. About two months 
later a different judge convicted him of obstructing 
police in relation to the second incident. Five years 
later the Ontario Superior Court of Justice dismissed 
the accused’s conviction appeals.  
The accused then appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing  that the police officer was not 
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engaged in the lawful execution of his duties at the 
time of the original arrests.  Thus, the offence of 
obstruct police was not made out. Regarding  the first 
incident, he submitted that since he had been 
properly served with valid provincial offence 
notices, the police had no further authority to 
impound the uninsured vehicle; they had no 
authority to require him to get out of the vehicle and 
he was not obstructing  by failing  to do so. Regarding 
the second incident, he contended that the police 
had no authority to impound the vehicle or to seize 
the licence plate because the vehicle was uninsured; 
thus they had no basis for believing  in the 
circumstances that the licence plate had been 
improperly obtained.   Finally, he contended the 
police were not entitled to enforce the provisions of 
Ontario’s Highway Traffic Act (HTA) through the 
obstruction provisions of the Criminal Code (CC).
Justice Blair, authoring  the unanimous judgment, 
disagreed with the accused.  “Peace officers act in 
the execution of their duty only if exercising  a power 
conferred by statute or by common law,” he said. As 
for a statutory power to impound a vehicle 
reasonably believed to be uninsured, there was 
none. Neither Ontario’s HTA or the Compulsory 
Automobile Insurance Act (CAIA) provided such an 
authority. Nor did Ontario’s Police Services Act. 
However, the police did have “the authority to stop 
and impound [the accused’s] vehicle based on 
powers inherent in the execution of their common 
law duties,” said Justice Blair. “Those duties include 
the preservation of the peace, the prevention of 
crime and the protection of life and property, from 
which is derived the duty to control traffic on the 
public roads”:
It may be true ... that the common law has never 
explicitly recognized the authority of the police 
to tow a vehicle as deriving from their general 
police duties. However, I see no reason why that 
should not be the case provided the Dedman/
Waterfield test is met in the circumstances and 
provided the police act reasonably and 
prudently.   Here, in my view, the test is met and 
the police acted reasonably and prudently.
[The police officer] and his companion officers 
were attempting to enforce the provisions of the 
Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act, acting 
on a reasonable belief, in both incidents, that 
[the accused’s] vehicle was not insured.  They 
were also acting pursuant to their common law 
duty to protect the life and property of the public 
and to ensure the safety of the roadways.   The 
first branch of the test is satisfied.
Was the use of the power justifiable in the 
circumstances, as required by the second 
branch?  In my opinion, it was.
An uninsured vehicle has no right to be on a 
public highway in Ontario.  The police had a 
reasonable belief that [the accused’s] vehicle 
was uninsured. What were they to do?  If they 
permitted the uninsured vehicle to continue to 
be driven on the highway, they ran the risk of an 
accident occurring and of someone being 
seriously injured or killed without the benefit of 
the safety network envisaged by the Compulsory 
Automobile Insurance Act.  If they did not permit 
the vehicle to be driven away – and it remained 
on the highway without being towed – it would 
constitute a hazard. The ability to impound the 
vehicle and have it towed away, in the 
circumstances, is a reasonable exercise of the 
police common law duty to prevent crime (the 
commission of further insurance-related driving 
offences), to protect the life and property of the 
public, and to control traffic on the public 
roads. [paras. 27-30]
And even though the operation of motor vehicles is 
subject to a highly regulated and comprehensive 
statutory regime establishing  the powers of the 
police (including  towing  powers) and the penalties 
for violating  this scheme, the court filled the gap by 
resorting  to the ancillary powers of police at 
common law. “I accept that courts should be 
cautious in extending  police power by resort to their 
common law ancillary powers, particularly in 
circumstances where the legislature has put in place 
an elaborate and comprehensive regulatory regime 
with carefully balanced powers and sanctions,” said 
Justice Blair. “However, the compulsory automobile 
insurance scheme enacted in Ontario is an 
important lynch-pin in the overall regime to promote 
the safety and well-being  of the public on the 
highways”:
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It does so by attempting to ensure that, when 
accidents occur, there is a financial safety 
network in place to support those who sustain 
personal injury or property damage, and their 
families.  That regime, and the role compulsory 
insurance plays in it, can only be reasonably 
protected if the police have the authority to 
cause uninsured vehicles to be removed from 
public highways and towed to safety in certain 
circumstances. [para. 32]
As well, although the right to circulate in a motor 
vehicle on the public highway is considered a 
‘liberty’ for purposes of the constitutional debate 
surrounding  motor vehicle legislation, it is not a 
fundamental liberty like the ordinary right of 
movement of the individual, but a licenced activity 
that is subject to regulation and control for the 
protection of the public. “Permitting  the police to 
cause an uninsured vehicle to be impounded and 
towed to safety falls squarely within the exercise of 
their duty to protect the life and property of the 
public,” said the Court. “[This]  outweighs the 
concern for caution in extending  police powers 
through resort to their common law duties in 
circumstances such as these.”
Obstruction
Since the police were engaged in “the lawful 
execution of their duties” when attempting  to 
impound the vehicle in both cases, the accused’s 
actions sufficiently frustrated the police efforts to 
constitute an offence under s.129 of the CC.  
Were the Police Attempting  to Use the Criminal 
Code Indirectly to Enforce Provincial Legislation? 
The accused’s additional argument that, even if the 
police were acting  in the execution of their duties by 
attempting  to enforce Ontario legislation related to 
the vehicle, the offence of obstructing  police under 
the CC was not available given the presence of more 
moderate means of enforcement was also 
rejected. Both s.23 of the HTA and s.2 of the CAIA 
provide for fines as a means of enforcing  the 
requirement that motor vehicles be insured. Neither 
statute provides for the power of arrest and a police 
officer’s power to enforce the statutes is limited to 
issuing  tickets. But in this case, the police were not 
using  precisely the same conduct forming  the 
provincial statute offences as the basis for the 
obstruct police charge:
In my view, however, the “precisely the same 
conduct” analogy does not fit here.   The police 
were not attempting to use the obstruct police 
charge to enforce the Highway Traffic Act 
offences for which [the accused] had already 
been ticketed, in relation to the first incident.  
Those tickets did not capture the offence 
committed, which was to interfere with the 
police officers’ efforts to impound the vehicle 
and have it towed away. Nor, with respect to the 
second incident, were they attempting  to enforce 
the “fail to stop” requirements of s. 216 of the 
Highway Traffic Act.  The offence of obstruct 
police, in that instance, was founded on [the 
accused’s] attempts to frustrate both the towing 
of the vehicle and the investigation regarding the 
validity of the licence plate. 
Moreover, in neither incident was there any 
evidence that the police were attempting  to 
utilize the provisions of the Criminal Code for 
punitive purposes. [paras. 41-42]
As well, the officer was entitled to seize the plate 
that was located in the rear window of the vehicle in 
order to investigate whether the plate or validation 
sticker had been obtained by means of a false 
statement in a certificate of insurance used to obtain 
it, contrary to the CAIA. Under the HTA a police 
officer is permitted to seize a vehicle licence plate or 
evidence of validation of a permit if the officer has 
reasonable grounds to believe the number plate or 
evidence of validation of a permit was obtained by 
false pretences.  The police were attempting  to do 
this when the accused jumped out the passenger 
side of his vehicle – opposite from where the police 
were standing  – and locked the doors with the keys 
inside, thus frustrating  their attempts to seize the 
plate.   He was guilty of obstructing  the police in the 
execution of their lawful duty on this basis as well. 
The accused’s appeals were dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
www.10-8.ca
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LAW DOES NOT MANDATE 
CONFIRMATION OF OFFENCE 
BEFORE MAKING ARREST 
R. v. Hillgardener, 2010 ABCA 80
An RCMP officer with only two years 
experience (but 75 prior drug 
investigations) received a phone call 
just before midnight f rom an 
informant indicating  that a street-
level drug  trafficker, a young  woman with brown or 
black hair who identified herself as “Ashley”, could 
be found driving  a black Acura RSX in the 
“downtown” area of town and would be carrying  a 
large amount of cocaine in her purse for the 
purposes of trafficking. The informant also provided 
the vehicle plate number. This informant was known 
to the officer, having  provided credible information 
in the past on eight occasions in exchange for 
compensation. The officer confirmed that the 
informer was later paid for the information provided 
in this case as on other occasions. He also 
confirmed that the informer had a criminal record, 
but it did not include perjury. The officer declined to 
be more specific about the informer in order to keep 
the informer’s identity confidential and deliberately 
left information out of his notes capable of revealing 
the informer.
Relying  on the informer’s information, the officer 
then went downtown to the area which was, to his 
knowledge, a “hotbed of drug  activity”. The officer 
agreed in cross-examination, however, that there 
were several such areas in the city, naming  three in 
particular before conceding  that 
it was “pretty much the whole 
area.” The off icer started 
checking  locations in his 
marked police vehicle. He saw 
the reported vehicle with a 
female in it, alone, at about 
12:15 am. The officer followed 
the Acura for about 20 seconds, 
turned on his emergency 
equipment, pulled it over and 
approached. The occupant 
matched the general description 
of a younger female with dark hair. Without asking 
who she was, to see her driver documents, or how 
long  she had been in vicinity, the officer told her she 
was under arrest for trafficking  in cocaine and to exit 
the vehicle. She got angry, questioned the reason for 
arrest and was resistant. She was handcuffed and put 
in the back of the police car. Her purse was left 
behind in the vehicle. The officer testified that he 
had seen the purse open on the accused’s lap when 
she was first arrested as if she was intending  to 
provide her driver’s documents. The officer agreed 
that he had not seen any contraband or money in 
plain view, nor did he see the accused talking  on a 
cell phone before arresting  her. Nor did he see 
anything  suspicious in the purse when it was open 
on the her lap. The officer then went back to the 
vehicle, took possession of, and searched the purse, 
which in his view, was incidental to arrest. But he 
agreed that he had no urgency or danger concerns 
when he searched the purse. In the purse he found 
a street-dealer’s stash; 90 grams of cocaine 
consisting  of 11 quarter-ounce pieces of crack 
cocaine in a zip-loc bag, a pill bottle with 51 more 
pieces, $500 in cash, and two mobile phones.
The trial judge found both the accused’s arrest and 
the subsequent search of the purse to be unlawful. 
He held that the arresting  officer did not have the 
reasonable grounds contemplated by s.495(1) of the 
Criminal Code to justify the arrest. The judge found 
the information that was provided was compelling 
and came from a credible source. However, he 
found the officer had corroborated some things - the 
car, the licence plate, the woman description - but 
not the information that she was doing  something 
illegal (involved in the drug 
trade). In his view, the police 
were required to confirm some 
aspect of the offence by the 
accused before reasonable 
grounds was met. The judge 
also held that the officer should 
not have searched the purse 
without a warrant since the 
accused was in the police 
vehicle and the officer could 
have obtained a warrant to 
search the purse. This, by itself, 
“The law does not mandate 
confirmation of the offence itself 
in all cases before effecting an 
arrest. ... “[The] precision and 
accuracy of precise details 
surrounding the matter together 
with a history of proven reliability 
can constitute reasonable and 
probable grounds.”  
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made the search of the purse unreasonable (even if 
the arrest was lawful) because the accused was no 
danger to the officer and exigent circumstances did 
not exist. The evidence was excluded under s.24(2) 
and the accused was acquitted of possessing 
cocaine for the purpose of trafficking  and possessing 
proceeds of crime.
The Crown appealed to the Alberta Court of Appeal 
arguing  that the trial judge erred in holding  there 
was no reasonable grounds. The Crown submitted 
that the judge departed from the totality of the 
circumstances test and elevated a single factor 
(independent verification of the tip) to an essential 
pre-condition. On the other hand, the accused 
submitted that the judge did not err in holding  that 
every element of the three part reasonable grounds 
test requires “some” evidence, and that the trial 
judge correct ly found that there was no 
corroboration of the tipster’s information about the 
accused being a drug trafficker before her arrest.
The Alberta Court of Appeal noted that the issue was 
not whether the officer could have done more  (such 
as ask questions or identify the accused) but whether 
what the officer knew and did provided reasonable 
grounds. “The law does not mandate confirmation of 
the offence itself in all cases before effecting  an 
arrest,” said the Court. “[The] precision and accuracy 
of precise details surrounding  the matter together 
with a history of proven reliability can constitute 
reasonable and probable grounds.” Confirmation of 
the offence alleged by the tipster itself was not 
required before the arrest. Thus, the law did not 
oblige the officer to corroborate the specific 
allegation of drug  trafficking  in some manner before 
arresting  the accused. In this case, the informer had 
been reliable on multiple occasions and had a cash 
incentive to be reliable with his tips. 
As for the search of the purse independently 
constituting  a s.8 Charter breach as an incident to 
arrest because there were no exigencies, the trial 
judge also erred. The Court of Appeal stated:
It is clear that the informer’s tip provided 
grounds to believe the purse contained 
evidence. This was arrest, not investigative 
detention, so the officer safety limitation 
discussed in investigative detention cases is not 
applicable to the situation. [para. 28]
Searches incidental to arrest are not only permissible 
for safety reasons but also to protect evidence from 
destruction at the hands of the arrestee or others and 
to discover evidence which can be used at the 
arrestee’s trial. Further, a search incidental to arrest 
does not independently require reasonable grounds. 
Here, the trial judge’s reasons stopped at safety and 
protection of evidence from destruction. He did not 
address the discovery of evidence usable at trial 
rationale which was reasonably to be expected from 
searching the purse. 
The Crown’s appeal was allowed and a new trial was 
ordered.  
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
Three Part Reasonable Grounds Test
The framework for the totality of the 
circumstances test in determining whether a 
police officer has reasonable grounds involves 
three inter-related considerations:
was the information predicting the 
commission of a criminal offence 
compelling?  
where that information was based on a 
"tip" originating from a source outside 
the police, was that source credible?
was the information corroborated by 
police investigation prior to making the 
decision to arrest or conduct the search? 
Weaknesses in one area may, to some extent, 
be compensated by strengths in the other 
two. For example, the precision and accuracy 
of precise details together with a history of 
proven informant reliability can constitute 
reasonable grounds, without independently 
corroborating the offence itself. 
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Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
?????????? ????? ?? ???? ?? ?????? ?? 
? ????? ?? ???????? ??? ?????
Following the accused’s conviction 
for trafficking morphine under s.
5(1) of the Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act, the sentencing 
judge declined to make a DNA order under the 
Criminal Code because it was her first drug offence and 
she had no record of violence. The Saskatchewan Court 
of Appeal, however, found the sentencing judge erred. 
The judge failed to look at the accused’s record as a 
whole—53 prior convictions—and the objectives of the 
DNA provisions. “In light of the nature of the 
[accused’s] current offence, her lengthy record, her 
history of recidivism, and the relatively modest impact 
an order would have on her privacy and security 
interests, we are satisfied an order should have been 
made,” said Justice Cameron for the unanimous Court 
of Appeal in holding that bodily samples be taken from 
the accused. - R. v. Heisler, 2010 SKCA
Alberta Court of Appeal
???????? ?? ????????? ?? ??????? ???? 
??? ??????????? ????? ???????? ?
Two stolen Neon motor vehicles 
were driven well over the speed 
limit into a cul-de-sac where one 
T-boned the other before three 
males from the vehicles fled the area. Both Neons were 
later found to have damaged ignitions and one was 
missing a side mirror and the other a hub cap, which 
were found nearby parked car and truck that were 
damaged the same night. Witnesses saw the males 
leaving  the scene, run through a condominium parking 
lot, jump a fence, and enter a field where they were 
subsequently arrested by police. A police dog  tracked 
from the fence to where the suspects were stopped and 
two of the suspects (not the accused) had glass shards 
in their clothing and their fingerprints were found in 
each of the Neons. At trial the accused was convicted 
of several offences including  dangerous driving, 
possession of a stolen vehicle, and three counts of 
leaving  the scene of motor vehicle accidents. But the 
convictions were quashed on appeal.
Although it was reasonable for the trial judge to infer 
that the accused was a passenger in one of the Neons 
and one of three persons who fled the vehicles 
immediately after the crash, there was nothing directly 
linking him to either specific Neon vehicle. And the 
theory that all three were involved in a “joint venture” 
to race the Neons and smash them up was just a 
theory. “It had a certain plausibility but nothing  more 
than that,” said the Alberta Court of Appeal. “It was still 
essentially speculation.” Proof of possession of stolen 
property requires proof of knowledge and control. 
Since the accused was at least a passenger in one of 
the Neons knowledge of the stolen nature of the 
vehicles might be inferred from the condition of the 
steering columns and post-crash conduct, but there 
was no evidence of control by him. There was no 
evidence of abetting possession of stolen property nor 
evidence that he was a driver. He was nothing more 
than a passenger. And even if the accused was 
physically inside one of the Neons when it was being 
driven in a dangerous manner, there was no evidence 
he was driving or did anything  to aid or encourage 
either of the drivers to drive dangerously. There must be 
evidence before it can be inferred that a passenger is a 
party to a driving offence. Any inference that he 
assisted, counseled, or encouraged the manner of 
driving  was conjecture. As for the hit and run 
convictions there was no evidence the accused did 
anything but run away with the others. “Whether or not 
he was a driver, he would have had a motive to run 
away and so did the other two,” said the Court. “The 
others did not need his encouragement to run away 
themselves for the same reason. Flight, a form of post-
offence conduct which is itself a species of 
circumstantial evidence, may justify an inference in 
favour of a specific reason for the flight unless there is 
more than one equally valid reason within the 
boundaries of inference for the flight. There was more 
than one reasonable inference here [and it was] not 
likely that any of them had to encourage the others to 
flee the scene.” - R. v. Smith, 2010 ABCA 46
Jurisprudence Jolt
IN BRIEF: This section provides a peek of what’s happening in appeal courts across the country.
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Ontario Court of Appeal
?? ???????????? ?????????? ??? ????? 
?? ???????? ??????????? ?
Following  charges being laid 
against the accused for fraud and 
forgery involving  the alleged 
defrauding of a company (where 
he was the CFO) of about $1.8  million, he wanted a 
second forensic audit done by the Crown. He 
suggested that he had previously worked for the firm 
that did the audit and that the auditor who did the first 
audit may have had a personal animus against him. The 
second audit proposed by the accused would have 
been very expensive and was not done. The trial judge 
ruled that the constitutional right to make full answer 
and defence included the right to have the prosecution 
investigate any defences that were “not fanciful or 
speculative.” Thus, the accused was constitutionally 
entitled to have the police pursue an avenue of 
investigation if the defence could show there was a 
realistic possibility that pursuing that line of 
investigation could assist them. The Crown’s failure to 
produce the second forensic audit constituted a 
violation of the Crown’s “duty to investigate” and 
denied him the opportunity to make full answer and 
defence. The trial judge entered a stay of proceedings.
The Crown challenged the judge’s ruling  to the Ontario 
Court of Appeal, which overturned the lower court’s 
opinion and found the “Crown was not under any duty, 
constitutional or otherwise, to obtain the forensic audit 
demanded by the defence” and that its “failure to do so 
did not result in any constitutional violation of the 
accused’s right to make full answer and defence.” 
Justice Doherty, authoring the Appeal Court’s judgment, 
concluded there was no freestanding constitutional 
right to an adequate investigation. The prosecutorial 
authorities carry the ultimate responsibility to 
determine the direction of an investigation, not the 
defence. - R. v. Darwish, 2010 ONCA 124
CASE QUOTE
“An accused does not have a freestanding constitutional 
right to an adequate investigation of the charges against 
him or her. Inadequacies in an investigation may lead to 
the ultimate failure of the prosecution, to a specific 
breach of a Charter right or to a civil remedy.  Those 
inadequacies do not,  however, in-and-of-themselves 
constitute a denial of the right to make full answer and 
defence. 
An accused also does not have a constitutional right to 
direct the conduct of the criminal investigation of which 
he or she is the target.   ...  [T]he defence cannot, through 
a disguised-disclosure demand, “conscript the police to 
undertake investigatory work for the accused”. That is 
not to say that the police and the Crown should not give 
serious consideration to investigative requests made on 
behalf of an accused. Clearly,  they must. However,  it is 
the prosecutorial authorities that carry the ultimate 
responsibility for determining the course of the 
investigation. Criminal investigations involve the use of 
public resources and the exercise of intrusive powers in 
the public interest. Responsibility for the proper use of 
those resources and powers rests with those in the 
service of the prosecution, and not with the defence. 
Nor does the disclosure right, as broad as that right is, 
extend so far as to require the police to investigate 
potential defences.  ...  [references omitted, paras. 29-31]
An interpretation of the right to make full answer and 
defence that imposes a duty on the prosecution to 
investigate possible defences is also irreconcilable with 
the basic features of the criminal justice system.   No 
doubt, the Crown has obligations to an accused and to 
the administration of justice that go beyond those 
normally imposed on opposing counsel in litigation.  
However, the criminal justice system remains essentially 
an accusatorial and adversarial one.   The prosecution, 
which includes the Crown and the police, is charged with 
the responsibility of investigating and prosecuting crime 
in the public interest.    To do so the prosecution must 
investigate allegations, lay charges and prove those 
charges in a criminal proceeding.   To properly perform 
these functions the prosecution must decide on the 
nature and scope of an investigation.    The accused is 
entitled to the product of that investigation, but is not 
entitled to dictate the nature or scope of that 
investigation.   .” [para. 39] R. v. Darwish, 2010 ONCA 
“You’re a Policeman”
When the hours seem long and the going, rough
When the pay seems small and the criminals, tough
Just square your shoulders and call their bluff
Let them be the ones to cry, “Enough”
W.H. Drane Letser, Inspector, FBI
May 1, 1936
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Ontario Court of Appeal
????????????? ????? ????????? ? 
???????
The accused was convicted by a 
jury in the Ontario Superior Court 
of Justice on a charge of possessing 
crack cocaine for the purpose of 
trafficking, even though there was no direct evidence 
linking him to the cocaine.  The Crown’s case was 
circumstantial, which included (1) about 26.92 grams 
of crack cocaine situated in plain view on the centre 
console of the car between the driver and the accused, 
who was a passenger in the front seat of the car; (2) the 
drugs, contained in a small opaque grocery bag, were 
perched on the console atop two cell phones; (3) the 
grocery bag was knotted over its contents into a shape 
like a golf ball; (4) the drugs had a street value in 
excess of approximately $5,380; (5) the accused was in 
the stopped vehicle for at least five minutes prior to his 
arrest; and (6) on his arrest, the accused had $270 in 
small denominations in his possession.
On appeal to the province’s top court, the accused 
argued that there was insufficient evidence of his 
knowledge or control of the cocaine to establish 
constructive possession under s.4(3)(a)(ii) of the 
Criminal Code or joint possession under s.4(3)(b).   The 
Ontario Court of Appeal found the evidence of the 
physical proximity of the drugs to the accused, the 
degree of visibility of the drugs, the shared use of the 
vehicle at the time of the accused’s arrest, the quantity 
and value of the drugs seized, the size and nature of 
the bag containing the drugs, the presence of 
equipment – cell phones – normally used in drug 
trafficking, and possession by the accused of monies in 
a form and amount consistent with drug  trafficking 
provided, in combination, a sufficient basis on which a 
jury could properly infer knowledge and control of the 
crack cocaine by the accused. The accused’s 
conviction appeal was dismissed. - R. v. Duvivier, 2010 
ONCA 136 
Ontario Court of Appeal
?? ???????? ?????????? ??? ????? ?? 
??????? ????????
The accused, a firearms dealer and 
manufacturer, allowed his firearms 
licence and Firearms Acquisition 
Certificate to expire without 
renewal. His wife (and co-accused) also allowed her 
firearms licence to expire. The police, acting on the 
authority of two search warrants, seized more than 200 
firearms and related devices, together with more than 
20,000 rounds of ammunition and boxes of military-
related books and associated paraphernalia from the 
couple’s home.  Many of these weapons were 
discovered in a hidden storage room in the basement 
of the house. At trial in the Ontario Superior Court of 
Justice the accused testified he was preparing to defend 
himself, and others, in the event of a war. Even though 
he knew that he did not, nor any business run by him, 
have any legal authorization or licence permitting  the 
possession of the firearms and associated devices, he 
argued that he and his wife were entitled to possess the 
firearms because they had a constitutional right to 
possess firearms for self-defence. The trial judge 
disagreed and the accuseds were convicted of various 
weapons related offences. 
The accuseds then appealed to Ontario’s highest court, 
arguing, among other grounds, that the trial judge erred 
in his ruling  regarding the constitutionality of the 
firearms provisions. The Ontario Court of Appeal 
rejected the accuseds’ submission that they had a 
constitutional right to possess arms in their home for 
self-defence, free from government interference or 
regulation.   Parliament has the jurisdiction to constrain 
the right to posses firearms and the Supreme Court has 
already recognized that the possession and use of 
firearms is a heavily regulated activity aimed at 
ensuring  peace, order, and public safety. And even 
assuming that a right to possess and use firearms comes 
within the reach of s.7 of the Charter, it is not absolute.  
“The impugned firearms legislation does not prohibit 
the right to possess and use firearms for self-defence – 
in the home or elsewhere,” said the Court of Appeal.  
“It simply regulates the circumstances under which 
such possession and use are permissible.” Further, there 
is no protected constitutional right in Canada to 
possess or use firearms. Possession and use of firearms 
is not a right or freedom guaranteed under the Charter, 
unlike the American Constitution. Rather, possessing 
guns in Canada is a privilege. The accuseds’ conviction 
appeal was dismissed. -  R. v. Montague, 2010 ONCA 
141
Note-able Quote
"Even when laws have been written down, they 
ought not always to remain unaltered." - Aristotle 
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Ontario Court of Appeal
???? ??????? ?????????? ???????? ? 
??????
A plainclothes police officer was 
conducting  curfew checks on 
individuals involved with gangs 
and violent crimes when his 
attention was drawn to a vehicle that was associated to 
a prohibited driver. The vehicle sped through a 
residential neighbourhood and failed to stop at stop 
signs nor indicate turns. A traffic stop was subsequently 
made and the accused (the lone occupant) was arrested 
for dangerous driving. However, he was not advised of 
his s.10(b) right to counsel. When asked if there were 
any guns or weapons in the car, the accused said there 
was a gun on the back seat. Police looked and found a 
loaded handgun under a coat on the rear seat. He was 
then told of his right to counsel. Police also took a 
video statement about an hour after arrest. At the 
accused’s trial on several weapons offences the judge 
ruled that the right to counsel had not been breached 
during  the obtaining of the roadside statement. The 
accused was convicted. On appeal by the accused to 
the Ontario Superior Court of Justice the roadside 
statement was found to have resulted from a s.10(b) 
Charter breach as was the video statement, a derivative 
of the roadside one and thereby tainted as a result. 
Nevertheless, the appeal judge admitted both 
statements under s.24(2) and the accused’s appeal was 
dismissed. 
The accused then appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal which agreed that the statement given at the 
scene of the arrest and the later statement taken at the 
police station violated s.10(b). However, even if the 
statements should have been excluded the convictions 
would have still followed. Since the accused conceded 
that the gun itself was properly admitted, his 
knowledge that the gun was in the back seat and that 
he was in possession of it was supported by the 
following facts:
• the car belonged to the accused;
• he was the only occupant in the car;
• the loaded gun was sitting on the car’s back seat 
underneath the accused’s coat; and
• there was no evidence inconsistent with the 
accused’s guilt. He did not testify.
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. - R. v. Davis-
Harriot, 2010 ONCA 161
British Columbia Court of Appeal
???? ????? ????? ???????? ????? 
?????????? ?? ???? ????? ???????? ?
Acting  on informant information, 
the police established surveillance 
on a road close to a residence 
where the accused, who was 
known to them, was believed to be living. After 
stopping  a vehicle in which she was travelling, the 
police arrested her. At the scene of the arrest, a cellular 
telephone in the accused’s purse rang. Police answered 
it and the caller said he wished to purchase drugs and 
asked for the accused by name. The officer asked the 
caller to call back. A second officer answered a second 
call: the caller again asked for the accused. They 
discussed the price of the drugs to be purchased and a 
meeting was arranged. More calls asking  for the 
accused by name and discussing the purchase of drugs 
were received. A subsequent search of the accused’s 
residence resulted in the discovery of drugs, together 
with drug  paraphernalia and various documents 
bearing the accused’s name, in the master bedroom. 
The locked door of the bedroom was also opened with 
a key found in the accused’s purse. At trial in British 
Columbia Provincial Court the accused was convicted 
on three counts of possessing  a controlled substance 
for the purpose of trafficking. 
On appeal to the British Columbia Court of Appeal the 
accused argued that the trial judge erred in finding  that 
the Crown had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that 
she was in possession and control of the substantial 
quantity of drugs that were found in a house on the 
execution of a search warrant by the police. She 
contended, in part, that the judge erred in admitting  the 
evidence of the calls to her cellular telephone on the 
ground the evidence was hearsay because it was 
offered for the truth of its contents. But Justice Lowry 
disagreed. “Such calls are admissible as circumstantial 
evidence of knowledge of the purpose of drugs, which 
is an element of possession,” he said. The calls could 
be used to prove the nature of the activities to which 
the accused was involved. - R. v. Williams, 2009 BCCA 
284
Note-able Quote
"Intelligence is when you spot a flaw in your 
boss's reasoning. Wisdom is when you refrain 
from pointing it out." - James Dent
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British Columbia Court of Appeal
‘?? ??? ????? ?? ?? ??????’ ??????? 
???????? 
While going  through airport 
screening the accused placed his 
black canvas sports bag on the tray 
and the x-ray machine clearly 
showed a handgun in the open side compartment of 
the bag, together with what looked like a phone 
charger and other items. The police were contacted, 
seized the bag  which contained a loaded .38  semi-
automatic pistol, and arrested the accused. At trial the 
accused acknowledged that other articles in the bag 
were his but testified that the gun was not, that he did 
know it was in his bag, and that he did not know how 
it got there. He essentially argued that no one, 
especially him, could be so stupid as to carry a gun in 
a bag  through security since it would be obvious that 
the gun would be visible when the bag went through 
the screening process. Although the accused may have 
forgotten about it, the judge found the accused was in 
possession of the prohibited, unlicensed, and 
concealed gun. He was convicted of three weapons 
offences and sentenced to about 18 months in jail and 
given a lifetime firearms prohibition. 
 
An appeal by the accused to British Columbia’s high 
court was dismissed. The case against him was 
compelling. The accused testified he had packed his 
own bag, all of the items in the bag  returned to him 
were his, and that he used the bag on a regular basis. 
There was no evidence of anyone else having contact 
with the bag from the time he packed it the night 
before until the time he placed it on the screening 
conveyer belt. Nor did he offer any explanation when 
asked as to how the gun came to be in the bag if he did 
not place it there. This was not placing the onus on the 
accused to prove that someone else placed the gun in 
his bag. - R. v. Lynnerup, 2009 BCCA 531
SUPREME COURT TAKES 
LONGER TO RENDER JUDGMENT
In its “Bulletin of Proceedings: Special Edition, 
Statistics 1999 to 2009”, the workload of the 
Supreme Court of Canada was reported. In 2009 the 
Supreme Court heard 72 appeals, down from 82 in 
2008. This was the second lowest number of appeals 
heard by Canada’s top court in a single year during 
the last decade (up from 58 appeals heard in 2007).
Case Life Span
The time it takes for the Court to render a judgment 
from the date of hearing  the case is at an eleven year 
high. In 2009 it took 7.4 months for the Court to 
announce its decision after hearing  arguments, up 
from 4.8 months in 2008. Overall it takes 18.2 
months, on average, for the court to render an 
opinion from the time an application for leave to 
hear a case is filed. This too is up from the previous 
year (16.9 months). 
Appeals Heard
Of the 72 appeals heard in 2009, Quebec was the 
origin of the most appeals of any province at 22, 
followed by Ontario (12), Alberta (11), British 
Columbia (9), the Federal Court of Appeal (9), 
Saskatchewan (3), Yukon (2), and Manitoba, 
Northwest Territories, Nunavut, and Prince Edward 
Island each with one. No appeals originated from 
New Brunswick, Newfoundland, or Nova Scotia. 
Of the appeals heard in 2009, 
60% were civil while the 
remaining  40% were criminal. 
Fifteen percent (15%) of the 
criminal cases dealt with 
Charter issues, up from only 
7% in 2008. 
Twelve of the appeals heard in 2009 were as of 
right. This source of appeal includes cases where 
there is a dissent on a point of law in a provincial 
court of appeal. The remaining  60 cases had leave to 
appeal granted. This is where a three judge panel 
gives permission to the applicant for the appeal to be 
heard. 
Appeal Judgments
T h e r e w e r e 7 0 a p p e a l 
judgments released in 2009, 
down from 74 in 2008. Only 
two decisions last year were 
delivered from the bench while 
the remaining  68 were delivered after being 
reserved. Fourteen of the appeals were allowed 
while 19 were dismissed. Another 39 were under 
Civil
60%
Criminal
40%
Unanimous
63%
Split
37%
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reserve as of December 31, 2009. And the court was 
more split than the previous year. In 2009, only 63% 
of the Court’s decisions were unanimous. The 
remaining  37% were split. This disagreement, or lack 
of unanimity, among  Canada’s top jurists has never 
been so high during  the last decade except for 2007 
where the Court was unanimous in only 62% of its 
opinions. 
Source: www.scc-csc.gc.ca
EVIDENCE ABOUT GUN 
ADMISSIBLE DESPITE COPS 
EXCEEDING SCOPE OF INSTALL
R. v. Beaulieu, 2010 SCC 7 
As part of an extensive drug 
trafficking  investigation, police 
obta ined an author izat ion to 
intercept the accused’s private 
conversations. While installing 
listening  devices in his car, officers discovered 
hidden electrical switches underneath the 
dashboard. The officers followed the wires and 
found that they led to the centre of the console. They 
dismantled the console and found a hidden 
compartment containing  a leather case. The 
installation was stopped, the case opened, and a 
loaded firearm discovered. So as not to jeopardize 
the ongoing  investigation the police had the firearm 
rendered unusable and placed it back in the car. 
One year later the accused was  charged with 
possessing  a loaded prohibited firearm contrary to s.
95 of the Criminal Code. The gun was never 
recovered.
At trial in the Court of Quebec, the accused 
challenged the admissibility of the testimony relating 
to the discovery of the firearm. The judge found that 
the search was not performed for the purpose of 
installing  the device, ensuring  officer safety or 
protecting  the investigative technique, but the 
police, surprised by the discovery of the wires and 
hidden compartment, had abandoned the plan to 
install listening  devices.  As a result, the search 
exceeded the scope of the judicial authorization and 
violated s.8 of the Charter. The judicial authorization 
did not give the police carte blanche to search the 
vehicle in a manner or for a purpose that exceeded 
the terms of the judicial order. The judge, however, 
admitted the evidence pursuant to s.24(2), primarily 
on the basis that the police officers did not believe 
they were exceeding  the powers granted to them by 
the authorization and had not evidenced a flagrant 
disregard of the accused’s Charter rights. 
On appeal, however, a majority of the Quebec Court 
of Appeal (2:1) reversed the trial judge’s decision to 
admit the evidence. In the majority’s view the 
evidence was inadmissible under s.24(2), the 
accused’s conviction was set aside, and an acquittal 
was entered.
The Crown then appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Canada, which agreed that the majority of the Court 
of Appeal erred in interfering  with the trial judge’s 
weighing  of the factors in the s.24(2) analysis. 
“‘Considerable deference’ is owed to a trial judge’s 
s.24(2) assessment of what would bring  the 
administration of justice into disrepute having  regard 
to all the circumstances,” said Justice Charron for the 
unanimous Supreme Court. “In this case, the trial 
judge considered proper factors and made no 
unreasonable findings.”  Even with the new three-
part inquiry for determining  whether the admission 
of evidence would bring  the administration of justice 
into disrepute, which includes:  
• the seriousness of the Charter-infringing 
state conduct; 
• the impact of the breach on the Charter-
protected interests of the accused; and 
• society’s interest in the adjudication of the 
case on its merits;
the outcome would not have been affected.  The 
Charter breach was at the less serious end of the 
spectrum. As for the impact of the breach, the 
accused had a reduced privacy interest in his car 
and the scope and invasiveness of the search was 
limited. And finally, with regard to society’s interest 
in an adjudication on the merits, the evidence was 
crucial to the Crown’s case, and the gun was reliable 
evidence. The Crown’s appeal was allowed and the 
accused’s conviction restored. 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
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IMPAIRED DRIVING OFFENCES & 
EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY
Staff Sergeant Steven Ing, LL.B. 
Victoria Police Department
A recent decision from the Ontario Court of Justice 
(Provincial Court level) regarding  an impaired 
driving  charge and the "evidence to the contrary" 
defence has helped to clarify the effect of Bill C-2.  
Readers may recall that in July 2008, Bill C-2 
amended s.258 of the Criminal Code (CC), which is 
the section that creates the legal presumption that a 
reading  from an approved instrument of over 80 mgs 
is proof that the offence was committed, absent any 
evidence to the contrary.
Historically in BC, courts were allowing  an 
extremely wide latitude to the "evidence to the 
contrary" defence, which in lay terms worked this 
way:  the accused and/or his pals claimed that the 
accused only had 2 drinks; the defence calls an 
expert to say that if the accused only had 2 drinks, 
his reading  couldn't have been over 80.  This was 
often accepted as creating  a reasonable doubt even 
in the face of a perfect breath test operation (again, 
especially in BC).
The 2008 CC amendments specify that the "evidence 
to the contrary" must consist of more than the 
accused simply claiming  that their alcohol 
consumption pattern could not have produced the 
readings obtained by police (the new requirements 
for the defence are summarized below).  Although 
there have been no published BC decisions in 
relation to the Bill C-2 amendments, a recent case in 
Ontario clarified that the amendments themselves 
are not unconstitutional.  In addition to the 
constitutional challenge, the accused also claimed 
that the “evidence to the contrary” defence itself was 
effectively neutralized by the amendments.  
However, on that point the court found that the 
defence still exists - it is simply harder to 
successfully raise now.
What is relevant for operational purposes is that the 
decision clarifies how the "evidence to the contrary" 
defence now works.  The defence must present 
evidence that raises a reasonable doubt in ALL of 3 
areas:
• The approved instrument malfunctioned or 
was operating incorrectly;
• The malfunction or improper operation 
produced a result over the legal limit;
• The accused's BAC was under the legal limit 
at the time of the offence.
Therefore, an accused who wants to raise this 
defence must now present more than just the 
traditional consumption/expert back calculation 
evidence - the accused will have to provide specific 
evidence with regard to the operation of the 
instrument (i.e. incorrect calibration, procedural 
checks not followed, etc.). Consumption evidence, 
in and of itself, is now insufficient to be considered 
"evidence to the contrary".
Where officers are faced with a challenge in court 
the way the defence was formerly run (that is, where 
the accused only presents consumption "evidence" 
to rebut the breath test reading), the Police/Crown 
response should be along the following lines:
An "evidence to the contrary" defence that offers 
nothing  more than an accused's consumption 
pattern will no longer be capable of possessing  the 
requisite air of reality where the balance of the 
evidence is incapable of raising  a reasonable doubt 
about the accuracy of breath tests.
The benefits of this decision are most likely going  to 
be seen by Crown Counsel, police supervisors who 
are reviewing  impaired driving  reports, and 
investigators who may be faced with a threatened 
"evidence to the contrary" defence that does not 
meet the new criteria. However, be aware that the 
decision is from the Ontario Court of Justice (their 
Provincial Court), meaning  it is persuasive but not 
binding  here in B.C. The decision itself is 62 pages 
long, and has not been made available online yet.  
The case name is R. v. Muzuva, and it was an oral 
judgment delivered by Justice Fraser on Jan. 7, 2010.
